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Abstract 
Advertising may reinforce brief and immediate relational responses (BIRRS) of 
correspondence between “happiness” and “material wealth.” My research looked 
into the possibility of changing BIRRs associated with materialism through 10 
minutes of training prior to taking the IRAP. I hypothesised that participants can 
become more or less materialistic through reinforcement of materialistic or anti-
materialistic relational responding. Eighty-four participants were assigned to one of 
three groups, Materialistic, Anti-Materialistic, or Control, and received relevant 
training followed by an Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) and 
Materials Value Scale (MVS) survey. The IRAP was used to measure response 
latencies when individuals responded to pairs of stimuli consistent (e.g., 
happy/luxury) or inconsistent (e.g., happy/cheap) with materialistic attitudes. The 
MVS is a survey intended to measure materialism. Results showed that participants 
were faster to respond materialistically than they were to respond anti-
materialistically, regardless of the type of training that they received. Regression 
analysis showed that participants who completed more Anti-Materialistic training 
blocks were predicted to score higher on the MVS. I concluded that, 10 minutes of 
training was not sufficient to affect BIRRs associated with materialism. Moreover, 
the results indicate that the relational network associated with “being materialistic” 
is complex and that there is not a clear “opposite” of materialism.  
Experiment 2 was a focus group, designed to investigate participant’s thoughts 
regarding the stimuli used in Experiment 1. Participants from Experiment 1 were 
invited back for focus group sessions. The key findings from the focus group was 
that the stimuli used in Experiment 1 was not fully reflective of Anti-Materialism 
and the lack of context during the IRAP compounded into a different interpretation 
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of “Anti-Materialism” for the participants. There is more to Anti-Materialism than 
the direct opposite of Materialism.  
  
iv 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis would not have been possible without the support of some key 
figures. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors Dr Timothy 
Edwards and Dr Rebecca Sargisson for their support, critical insights, timely 
comments, and plenty of proofreading to shaping this thesis into something legible. 
This has been an incredible journey of learning the small nuances of the English 
language, academic writing, and research. I would also like to acknowledge the 
financial, and technical support of the University of Waikato. 
 To my friends, for their support and encouragement throughout this journey. 
A big thanks to Joseph Graddy for his ideas and tutelage into the world of IRAP, 
BIRRs, EERRs, and RFT in general. RFT buddies for life! 
 To the love of my life, Boon Mong Na, for the care, patience, and delicious 
meals. Her quick cooking tips enable me to be an amateur chef and whip up some 
form of palatable food in times of need.  
 Lastly, I extend my appreciation and gratitude to my family. My father, 
Vincent, for the opportunity to pursue this Master’s degree overseas, to my mother, 
Shirley, and my brother, Shaun, for the moral support.  
 
  
v 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... iv 
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................ v 
Figures....................................................................................................................... vii 
Tables ........................................................................................................................ vii 
Appendix .................................................................................................................. viii 
General Introduction ................................................................................................... 1 
Implicit Attitudes..................................................................................................... 1 
IAT .......................................................................................................................... 7 
IRAP ........................................................................................................................ 8 
Comparison: Why IRAP and not the IAT ............................................................. 10 
Materialism............................................................................................................ 14 
Experiment 1 ............................................................................................................. 17 
Method ...................................................................................................................... 20 
Participants ............................................................................................................ 20 
Apparatus .............................................................................................................. 20 
Design.................................................................................................................... 21 
Procedure ............................................................................................................... 22 
Results ....................................................................................................................... 25 
Data Processing ..................................................................................................... 25 
Pass Rates .............................................................................................................. 26 
Split Half Reliability ............................................................................................. 26 
Trial type analysis ................................................................................................. 26 
ANOVA ................................................................................................................ 29 
Regression ............................................................................................................. 32 
Discussion ................................................................................................................. 34 
Materialistic Group ............................................................................................... 35 
Anti-Materialistic Group ....................................................................................... 36 
Control Group ....................................................................................................... 36 
Attrition Rate ......................................................................................................... 38 
Regression ............................................................................................................. 39 
Limitations, Future Research, and Conclusions .................................................... 40 
Experiment 2 ............................................................................................................. 42 
Thematic Analysis ................................................................................................. 42 
vi 
 
 
What is a Theme? .................................................................................................. 44 
Method ...................................................................................................................... 45 
Participants ............................................................................................................ 45 
Ethical consideration ............................................................................................. 45 
Procedure ............................................................................................................... 45 
Findings/Discussion .................................................................................................. 46 
The stimuli used do reflect Materialism ................................................................ 46 
The stimuli used do not reflect Anti-Materialism ................................................. 47 
Replacement of words that might reflect anti-materialism ................................... 50 
Happy works but not sad for the stimuli used ....................................................... 53 
MET training effects are too short ........................................................................ 54 
Awareness ............................................................................................................. 54 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 56 
General Discussion ................................................................................................... 57 
References ................................................................................................................. 58 
 
vii 
 
 
Lists of Figures and Tables 
Figures 
1.1 Screen presentation of IAT………………………………………………………7 
1.2 Screen presentation of IRAP…………………………………………………….9 
1.3 IRAP results from Barnes-Holmes et al. (2010) …………………………….…12 
1.4 Schematic diagram of Experiment 1..............................................................…...24 
1.5 Mean D-IRAP scores from Experiment 1………………………………………29 
1.6 Interaction plot from three-way ANOVA……………………..………………...31 
Tables 
1.1 IRAP stimuli used in Experiment 1….………………….………………………20 
1.2 D-IRAP score calculation steps…………………..…………………………..…25 
1.3 One sample t-tests results from Experiment 1….…………………………….…27 
1.4 Three-Way ANOVA results from Experiment 1……………………...……..…30 
1.5 Estimated Marginal Means Sample……………………………..………………30 
1.6 Estimated Marginal Means Target…………………………….………………..31 
1.7 Descriptive stats Total MVS………………………………….……………...…32 
1.8 One-Way ANOVA of Total MVS...……………………………….…………...32 
1.9 Regression results from Experiment 1……..……………………….……….….33 
2.1 Phases of Thematic Analysis…………………………………….…………….43 
viii 
 
 
List of Appendix 
Appendix 
 
A: Participant Information Sheet ……………………………...…….……..……….68 
 
B: Consent Form .................................................................................................…...70 
 
C: Experimenter Script…………………………………………….….……….……71 
 
D: Materials Value Scale …………………………………………….…....………..75 
 
E: Focus Group Prompts…………………………………………….….…...………77
1 
 
 
General Introduction 
Implicit Attitudes 
 Implicit attitudes can be defined as “introspectively unidentified (or 
inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favourable or 
unfavourable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects” (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995, p.8). As an example, imagine a child who gave a comment in the 
supermarket, “Mom, why is that man’s skin so black?” The mother then tells the 
child to respect other people and not say such things in public. This could be the 
beginning of teaching the child about racism or racial diversity, depending on how 
the parents answer the question “Why is that man so black?” Over the course of that 
child’s life, multiple messages by the community would either reinforce speaking 
out about differences in skin colour or accepting that everybody has different skin 
tone and that what they contribute to society as a whole is more important. When 
this child is asked about how racist they are on a questionnaire, they might answer 
that they are not racist and that they accept people of different skin colour. However, 
the same person might be observed to actively avoid people that are not of similar 
skin colour to themselves. Asking the child whether they are racist is a form of 
measuring their explicit attitudes as they can answer “no” or allude to answers that 
do not reflect racism. The implicit attitude can be observed through the child’s 
behaviour of actively avoiding people of different skin colour, even without the 
child’s conscious knowledge of their own avoidance behaviour.  
Researchers are rarely able to observe and scrutinize the behaviour of people 
in order to discover their “implicit attitudes”, thus computer programs have been 
developed to measure implicit attitudes, which are suggested to be the quickest 
response a person will make when tested under pressure. These programs are 
designed under the assumption that people are capable of responding more quickly 
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to relations that correspond with their implicit attitudes. For example, if when asking 
the child to quickly respond to whether “Black skinned” is “Good” or “Bad” the 
child is faster to respond “Bad” than ‘Good”, that should predict the child’s 
behaviour of “avoiding people of different skin colour”. These implicit attitudes 
have been shown to be a better predictor of behavioural outcomes than explicit 
measures such as self-report or questionnaires (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & 
Banaji, 2009; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007).  
Several studies have shown that people tend to behave differently than what 
they report in regards to their own behaviours (Castle, Handler, & Wagner, 2016; 
Corral-Verdugo, 1997; Jenner et al., 2006; Prince et al., 2008). Thus, the predictive 
validity of self-report measures of explicit attitudes and behaviour is quite low 
(Greenwald et al., 2009; Kraus, 1995). People tend to report their attitudes and 
behaviours in explicit measures which are not predictive of their own actual 
behaviours which potentially reflect their implicit attitudes. For example, Jenner et 
al. (2006), observed healthcare professionals in hospital wards practicing hand 
hygiene and compared that with questionnaires that the same healthcare 
professionals completed on their self-reported behaviour of hand washing. Their 
results showed that, while the hospital staff self-reported that they did practice 
proper hand hygiene, the actual observations of the staff performing hand hygiene 
practices was low. This shows that explicit measures of behaviour like self-reports 
or questionnaires do not reflect actual behaviour and therefore it is hard to predict 
behaviour using explicit measures alone.   
 Greenwald et al. (2009) have recommended using the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT; described below) together with self-report measures to better predict 
behaviour. In other words, a combined IAT and explicit measure with a high 
correlation serves as a better predictor of behaviour than using an explicit measure 
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alone. A few studies have shown that IAT scores and explicit measure scores 
correlate highly on certain topics, such as measuring prejudice based on religious 
ethnicity (Jewish vs Christian), age (young vs old), and nationality (American vs 
Soviet; Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999), anxiety (Egloff & 
Schmukle, 2002), or self-esteem and self-concept (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). It 
has also been shown that implicit measures are better predictors of behaviour than 
explicit measures when it comes to attitudes rated as ‘socially sensitive’. Socially 
sensitive topics are those that bring up “concerns about the impression that the 
response would make on others when self-reporting on constructs which are not 
talked about explicitly in public” (Greenwald et al., 2009, p.20). To put it 
behaviourally, it means that topics that are likely to be punished by the verbal 
community, for example, attitudes on race or ethnicity fall into the realm of socially 
sensitive topics, and, on these topics, explicit measures do not predict behaviour 
accurately because participants will answer so as not to provoke a judgemental 
response from the people around them while doing the self-report. Snowden, 
Wichter and Gray (2007) used the IAT to predict sexual orientation with 
homosexual and heterosexual men. Participants took the IAT as the implicit 
measure, followed by the Feeling thermometer and semantic differential as explicit 
measures, which were Likert scales asking the participants to rate their feelings 
towards homosexual or heterosexual concepts. Sexual orientation measures had 
always been previously dependent on self-report, but Snowden et al. showed a high 
correlation between IAT and the explicit measures. The conclusion was that the high 
correlation between IAT scores and the explicit measures showed that IAT was a 
viable tool to be used as a predictor for sexual orientation and erotic preference. 
Snowden et al.’s study demonstrates the IAT scores as a good predictor of behaviour 
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when explicit measures do not, this is still weak evidence for using implicit scores as 
predictors of behaviours.  
The measures of implicit attitudes rely on language, and behaviour to 
expresses those attitudes, which is a form of verbal behaviour. Relational Frame 
Theory (RFT) is a functional, behaviour-analytic approach to understanding human 
language and cognition (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). RFT focuses on 
stimulus equivalence and derived stimulus relations (Hayes et al., 2001), which can 
be taught. For example, teaching an A-B relation, a B-A relation will be derived. 
Further, teaching a B-C relation, three new derived relations will occur, C-B, A-C, 
and C-A. Imagine a child was shown a red fruit (A) and then given the letters that 
spelled out A-P-P-L-E (B), the child will then have learned that the ‘red fruit’ is 
spelled out as APPLE (A-B relation) and that APPLE is the ‘red fruit’ (B-A 
relation). To build onto that, the word APPLE (B) is pronounced as ‘ap-pel’ (C), the 
child will have learned the pronunciation of the word APPLE and APPLE sounds 
like ‘ap-pel’ (B-C and C-B relation). From there, the child can now derive that the 
‘red fruit’ is called an ‘ap-pel’ and ‘ap-pel’ is the ‘red fruit’ (A-C and C-A relation) 
without having to directly teach the child these relations. Stimulus equivalence is a 
behavioural description of an organism learning to respond to untrained stimuli 
based on deriving relations from previous learning history. RFT treats stimulus 
equivalence as a generalised operant (D. Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-Holmes, 2000; 
Hayes et al., 2001). To put it simply, if a person derives the relation that “Muslims” 
is the same as “bad”, the behaviour will now change to avoid people, such as 
walking away or walking to increase the gap between people that fit the idea of 
“Muslim”, such as people wearing turbans, have bushy beards, and follow Islam as a 
religion because they are “bad” people.  
5 
 
 
RFT theorists explain “attitude” as a kind of relational response that is under 
the control of previous history of reinforcement and certain contextual cues. What 
this means is that an organism will react towards a stimulus based on the relation the 
organism has with the stimulus. An example of this is selecting “good” when 
presented with words such as “white” and “Caucasian” which demonstrates a pro-
white attitude and “bad” with words such as “black” and “African”, demonstrating 
an anti-black attitude. These relations can be seen explicitly though the behaviour of 
avoiding black skinned individuals and more accepting behaviour towards white-
skinned individuals. The behaviours can be accounted for through the Relational 
Elaboration and Coherence (REC) model (D. Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, 
Stewart, & Boles, 2010; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013).  
The REC model explains how implicit relations and the explicit response 
come together through brief and immediate relational responses (BIRRs) and 
extended and elaborated relational responses (EERRs). As an example, imagine that 
you are in a meeting and your phone buzzes, you are about to reach for it like you 
usually do, but you stop midway because you remember you are in a meeting. What 
has occurred here, as explained through RFT lens is that, given the stimulus of your 
buzzing phone, the reaction of reaching out and checking what is on it (BIRR) has 
not cohered with the rule of ‘no phones during the meeting’ (EERRs). In the next 
few seconds of reaching out towards your pocket, other relational responding 
(EERRs) is occurring until coherence is achieved and thus, in the context of the 
meeting, you stop reaching out for the phone. If coherence has not been achieved, 
you would continue with the behaviour and check your phone and your colleagues 
will shoot disgusted or puzzled looks your way for your behaviour. To put it simply, 
BIRR is the ‘impulsive’ or ‘first reaction’ towards a stimuli, after a few moments 
have passed, if there is coherence, EERRs take over and a behaviour can stop or 
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change mid-way. The verbal community is constantly reinforcing coherence (and 
incoherence is punished), thus, achieving coherence becomes a type of conditioned 
reinforcer for language capable users (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). Like any 
other behaviour, relational responding occurs across time as well (Hughes & Barnes-
Holmes, 2013), with  BIRRs occurring in the first few seconds and the EERR 
occurring across longer periods. With that in mind, the REC model proposes that for 
implicit measures, the short latency is targeting the BIRRs and a longer latency in 
explicit measures are targeting the EERRs. When BIRRs cohere with EERRs, the 
REC model predicts no divergence, and divergence when they do not cohere.  
To explain divergence, consider the socially sensitive attitude towards the 
word ‘Muslim’. The word ‘Muslim’ is often reported in media with words of 
negative connotation, such as ‘terrorist’, ‘extremist’, and ‘dangerous’. From the RFT 
perspective, these words presented in a pair with ‘Muslim’ creates an equivalence 
relation whereby ‘Muslim’ is the SAME as ‘extremist’, ‘terrorist’ and ‘dangerous’. 
Implicit attitude researchers have found BIRRs consistent with anti-Muslim 
sentiment (Anderson & Koc, 2015; Gonsalkorale, Hippel, Sherman, & Klauer, 2009; 
Park, Felix, & Lee, 2007; Rowatt, Franklin, & Cotton, 2005). The verbal community 
will often reinforce positive verbal behaviours such as ‘treat everybody as equals’ or 
‘do not judge others’. However, with the media creating networks that ‘Muslim’ is 
the SAME as ‘terrorist’, when tested, the BIRRs do not cohere with previous verbal 
behaviours, the EERRs, and therefore diverge from the ‘everybody is equal’ 
relation. When the participants are given time to respond (in explicit measures), they 
are more likely to produce a response that does not reflect anti-Muslim sentiments.  
There have been a few methods that are designed to measure these implicit 
relations. Previously, the most used method was the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Recently, there is a new method of 
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measuring these implicit beliefs and attitudes, using the Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure (IRAP;  Power, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 
2009) 
IAT 
The IAT measures the association of concepts with an attribute. This is done 
through having the participants sort words that are presented one at a time, into two 
response options, as quickly as possible. The words used in IAT usually have 
relatively uniform evaluative association across subjects (e.g., good, bad) and words 
that relate to the attitude in question. To illustrate, take the seminal IAT study by 
Greenwald et al. (1998) who investigated attitudes towards pairs of target attitude 
concepts. Participants were presented with flower names (e.g., rose, tulip, marigold) 
versus insects (e.g., bee, wasp, horsefly) and were to pair them with target-concept 
discriminative words of pleasant (e.g., family, happy, peace) or unpleasant (e.g., 
crash, rotten, ugly). Figure 1.1 shows an example of two potential screen 
presentation that the participant might see.  
 
 
 
 
 
Participants were instructed to press ‘e’ to sort the term to the left, or ‘i’ to 
sort the term to the right. Response latencies are measured in both conditions; in the 
first condition, the response option shows a compatible combination, flower + 
pleasant or insect + unpleasant. The second condition shows an incompatible 
combination, insect + pleasant or flower + unpleasant. The difference in the mean 
response latencies in both conditions is assumed to be indicative of which category 
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is more positively evaluated. In most IAT studies, the difference in response 
latencies are transformed using Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji's, (2003) D-score 
algorithm to account for individual differences.  
 The differences in the scores paint a picture of the participant’s implicit 
attitude. To put in another way, if the participant responds faster in the compatible 
combination, than in the incompatible combination, it is assumed that the 
participant’s attitude towards flowers is more positive than it is towards insects. This 
means that we could predict that, when given a choice between a flower and an 
insect, the participant is more likely to choose the flower given the participant’s 
positive attitude towards flowers.   
IRAP 
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) was designed to 
directly measure implicit beliefs (D. Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006) through recording 
a participant’s reaction time to respond accurately to textual stimuli on the computer 
screen.. Figure 1.2 shows four possible screen presentations from the first IRAP 
study by Barnes-Holmes et al. (2006). Participants were presented with a sample 
stimulus (e.g., pleasant or unpleasant) at the top of the screen, followed by a target 
word that is deemed either pleasant (e.g., love) or unpleasant (e.g., sickness) in the 
middle, and two response options at the bottom that are either consistent or 
inconsistent with the target word.  
Participants were instructed to press ‘d’ for the term on the left or ‘k’ for the 
term on the right. Choosing the correct relational term removes the stimuli from the 
screen for 400ms before the next trial. Choosing the wrong relational term would 
result in a red X in the middle of the screen and the trial would not end until the 
participant chose the right term. In an IRAP trial, two sample stimuli (i.e. Pleasant or 
Unpleasant) and 12 target words (i.e. caress, freedom, health, love, peace, cheer, 
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abuse, crash, filth, murder, sickness, accident) are randomly paired so that each 
word appears twice, once with ‘Pleasant’ and once with “Unpleasant”, producing 24 
trials per block. Participants complete up to eight practice blocks to achieve the 
accuracy and response speed criteria. Once those criteria are met, participants will 
complete six test blocks. On half of those test blocks, participants are required to 
respond consistent with pre-experimentally established relations and in the other 
half, participants are to respond inconsistently with those relations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each consistent and inconsistent block is paired to create three block-pairs. 
In each block, instructions are provided at the start. Instructions on the consistent 
block would be “Please respond AS IF pleasant and love are similar”. Using Figure 
1.2 as an example, in the consistent block, participants need to choose ‘similar’ 
when they see “Pleasant” is presented with “Love” or ‘opposite’ when “Pleasant” is 
presented with “Sickness”. In the inconsistent block, the instruction given would be 
Figure 1.2. Four possible screen presentations of the first IRAP used by Barnes-
Holmes et al. (2006) showing the four trial types. The ‘consistent’ and 
‘inconsistent’ labels show the pre-experimentally established relations and are not 
visible to the participants.  
Pleasant 
Love 
Similar 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Opposite 
select ‘k’ for  select ‘d’ for  
Pleasant 
Sickness 
Similar Opposite 
Inconsistent Consistent 
select ‘k’ for  select ‘d’ for  
Similar Opposite 
Unpleasant 
Love
Consistent Inconsistent 
select ‘k’ for  select ‘d’ for  
Unpleasant 
Sickness
Similar Opposite 
Inconsistent Consistent 
select ‘k’ for  select ‘d’ for  
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“Please respond AS IF pleasant and love are opposite”; participants would now be 
required to choose ‘opposite’ when presented “Pleasant” with “Love” or ‘similar” 
when presented “Pleasant” with “Sickness”.  
The time from stimulus presentation to the first correct response is referred 
to as the response latency. The response latencies from the consistent block are 
compared with the response latencies from the inconsistent block. This difference in 
response latencies is transformed using an adaptation of Greenwald et al.’s (2003) 
D-score algorithm in order to minimise effects from individual differences in 
reaction time. When this difference between the mean response latency is 
significantly different from zero, it is termed the IRAP effect. To put it simply, IRAP 
effect is based on the brief and immediate relational responding which becomes 
apparent when the behavioural system is put under pressure to respond quickly and 
accurately (D. Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2010). In other words, the 
IRAP is measuring the response latency when the participant is put under a time 
pressure to respond quickly and accurately. 
Comparison: Why IRAP and not the IAT 
So far, I have briefly explained the procedure for IAT and IRAP and both 
programs were designed to measure response latency. The IRAP provides a more 
detailed assessment of relational terms towards an object (e.g., SIMILAR, 
OPPOSITE, MORE THAN, LESS THAN, D. Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006), while 
the IAT provides a relative measure towards an attitude, which is not a good 
prediction of behaviour. Knowing that the IAT only tells us the relative strength of 
the associations between stimuli (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013), we cannot 
accurately predict how the participant would respond in the presence of the stimuli 
in question. For example, imagine the situation of using the IAT to compare spiders 
with snakes. The IAT might show that the participants respond more positively 
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towards snakes than spiders, meaning that participants would rather avoid a spider 
than a snake. However, should the event become a reality, and the participant 
encounters a spider and a snake, the participant would most likely avoid both. This 
situation brings up some limitations with the IAT; firstly, the IAT can only predict 
behaviour in a specific event, when both stimuli are present, to avoid a spider or a 
snake. Secondly, if the event really occurs, the IAT cannot determine if the 
participant would rather choose to avoid or approach the stimuli. The IRAP however 
could detect whether spiders elicit a positive/negative bias and if snakes elicit a 
positive/negative bias. This amount of detail, based off the D-IRAP score would 
give a better prediction of behaviour, whether the participant would avoid one or the 
other, or both.  
To show this difference between IAT and IRAP, take one study by Barnes-
Holmes, Murtagh, Barnes-Holmes and Stewart (2010), who used IAT and IRAP 
scores to assess the attitudes of vegetarians and non-vegetarians towards meat and 
vegetables. In the IAT, participants were presented images of meat (e.g., bacon), or 
vegetables (e.g., cabbage) and asked to pair it the images either a positive object 
(e.g., smiling baby), or a negative object (e.g., crying baby). Participants were given 
either the Meat + Positive IAT, where participants were to categorize meat with 
positive images and vegetables with negative images, or the Vegetable + Positive 
IAT which is the opposite. In the IRAP, participants were required to respond either 
‘true’ or ‘false’ when presented with the image of meat (e.g., bacon) or vegetable 
(e.g., broccoli) paired with the words ‘Pleasant’ or ‘Unpleasant’. In the pro-
vegetable to pro-meat sequence, participants are to respond True to Pleasant-
Vegetable and Unpleasant-Meat, or False to Unpleasant-Vegetable and Pleasant-
Meat. In the Pro-meat to pro-vegetable sequence, participants are to respond the 
opposite to the pro-vegetable to pro-meat sequence. Figure 1.3 shows the results 
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from Barnes-Holmes et al.’s (2010) study, with the IRAP results on the left panel, 
and the IAT results on the right panel.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 (left panel) shows the results from the IRAP. A positive D-IRAP 
shows a pro-vegetable bias and a negative D-IRAP score shows a pro-meat bias. A 
pro-vegetable bias indicates that participants were quicker to press “True” when 
presented “Pleasant-Vegetable” or “Unpleasant-Meat” and “False” when presented 
“Pleasant-Meat” or “Unpleasant-Vegetable” pattern. Figure 1.3 (right panel) shows 
the results from the IAT, the greater the D-score, the more pro-vegetable the 
participant is. A pro-vegetable bias means participants were quicker to respond to 
“Vegetable + Positive” and “Meat + Negative” trials than the “Vegetable + 
Negative” and “Meat + Positive” trials. The results from the IRAP and IAT both 
showed that it both groups have a preference for vegetables over meat (D. Barnes-
Holmes, Murtagh, et al., 2010). The information from the IAT only tells us there is a 
Figure 1.3. Results of an IRAP (left) and an IAT (right) designed to measure attitudes 
towards vegetable and meat from Barnes-Holmes et al. (2010). For the IRAP, positive 
D-IRAP scores reflect a pro-vegetable bias and a negative D-IRAP score reflect a pro-
meat bias. A pro-vegetable bias means that participants would be quicker to press 
“True” to ‘Pleasant-Vegetable” and “Unpleasant-Meat” and “False” to “Pleasant-
Meat” and “Unpleasant-Vegetable”. A pro-meat bias means participants were quicker 
to respond in the opposite pattern. For the IAT, a greater D-score indicates participants 
were faster to respond to Vegetable + Positive and Meat + Negative trials than on the 
Vegetable + Negative and Meat + Positive trials.  
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pro-vegetable bias in both vegetarians and meat-eaters (lower bias in meat-eaters). 
The IRAP however provides more detail, we can see that meat-eaters are pro-
vegetable as well as pro-meat. Information from the IRAP provides more detail as it 
can show a pro-vegetable and a pro-meat bias in one group whereas the IAT only 
shows the pro-vegetable bias. This difference in information highlights the 
advantage of using the IRAP over the IAT.  
Another  example of the distinction between IRAP and IAT can be observed 
in the study by Barnes-Holmes, Waldron, Barnes-Holmes and Stewart (2009), who 
tried to predict if participants were city or rural dwellers by measuring their attitudes 
towards city and country life. The results of the IAT and IRAP could show that there 
was a ‘pro-country’ bias, but the IAT could not discriminate between the city and 
rural groups. The IRAP however, showed that rural-dwellers have a much stronger 
preference towards the country life than city-dwellers and therefore could 
discriminate between rural or city dwellers. 
To summarize, while both the IAT and the IRAP require the participants to 
respond quickly and accurately, the IAT has a few issues, which is that the IAT is 
focussed on associations rather than the relations between the stimuli or events, 
therefore the IAT only provides an indirect measure of beliefs (D. Barnes-Holmes et 
al., 2006). Also, the IAT only provides a relative measure of a person’s attitude 
(Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). In other words, the IAT is not able to assess the 
relations towards an object which means it is difficult to predict behaviour based on 
the results of IAT alone. The analysis of IRAP trial types provides more detail over 
the IAT. There is evidence to show that the IRAP is as good as, if not better, than 
other implicit and explicit measures when it comes to predicting behaviour in the 
real world (Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012).  
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Materialism 
There are plenty of definitions for the word ‘materialism’ and research 
regarding materialism can be very broad, ranging from different definitions of 
materialism or what constitutes materialism, but the earliest attempt to measure 
materialism was by Belk (1985) who suggested that materialism is a trait composed 
of three facets: envy, non-generosity, and possessiveness. Since then, there have 
been more empirical methods for measuring materialism developed by Richins and 
Dawson (1992) and Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996) who measured materialism as a 
goal or value that reflects an individual’s beliefs. Currently, the most widely used 
method to assess materialism is the Materials Values Scale (MVS; Richins & 
Dawson 1992), or the revised and shortened scale by Richins (2004). The MVS was 
developed with three components in mind – acquisition centrality (e.g., “I like a lot 
of luxury in my life”), acquisition as the pursuit of happiness (e.g., “I’d be happier if 
I could afford to buy more things”), and possession-defined success (e.g., “The 
things I own say a lot about how well I’m doing in life”). Other researchers have 
adapted the MVS for different populations such as the MVS-c for children (Opree, 
Buijzen, van Reijmersdal, & Valkenburg, 2011). Over the years, materialism has 
been studied through explicit measures, and my research is the first to measure the 
implicit attitudes of materialism.  
Materialism has been associated with treating others in a more selfish way 
(Kasser, 2016), for example, those with a higher materialism score tend to score 
lower in empathy (Sheldon & Kasser, 1995) and higher in narcissism (Kasser & 
Ryan, 1996), have more antisocial behaviours (Kasser & Ryan, 1993; McHoskey, 
1999), engage in fewer prosocial behaviours (Briggs, Landry, & Wood, 2007; 
Goldberg & Gorn, 1978; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995), and are predicted to be more 
competitive in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (Sheldon, Sheldon, & Osbaldiston, 
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2000). Overall, people who score higher on the materialistic scale tend to be more 
self-centred, not team-players, and generally exhibit more anti-social behaviours.  
People are consistently being exposed to advertising in different mediums 
such as advertising on websites, bus stops, YouTube videos, newspapers, television, 
etc. Constant exposure to materialistic messages causes people to be more 
materialistic (Shrum et al., 2014). On top of that, advertising exposure has subtle 
and long-term effect on materialism (Harmon, 2001), which means that repetitive 
exposure to advertising might make people more materialistic (Opree, Buijzen, van 
Reijmersdal, & Valkenburg, 2013). These exposures to materialistic messages 
probably created relational networks that lead people to achieve the relation “being 
materialistic leads to success” or “acquiring material possessions makes me 
happier”. With research showing that materialistic people tend to be less pro-social, 
it would be in society’s interest to decrease materialistic attitudes. There are three 
strategies outlined by Kasser (2016) to decrease materialistic values which are 
supported by empirical and theoretical work. The first strategy is to encourage 
values that are opposite to materialistic values. For example, Kasser suggests 
interventions and policies that encourage intrinsic values that support attitudes and 
behaviours that are more beneficial. For example, helping out more with charity 
work or volunteering in the community. The second strategy is to reduce the extent 
of materialistic values people are exposed to; and the final strategy is to help people 
feel more positive about themselves in terms of physical and psychological needs. 
Research has shown that people who are more materialistic tend to be less satisfied 
with life and have a lower quality of life than less materialistic people (Goldberg & 
Gorn, 1978; Kashdan & Breen, 2007; Kasser & Ryan, 1993; Opree, Buijzen, & 
Valkenburg, 2012; Sirgy et al., 1998), have lower self esteem (Chaplin & John, 
2007), and the drive to obtain material wealth is a mediator between life satisfaction 
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and emotional well-being (Chen, Yao, & Yan, 2014; Kashdan & Breen, 2007; 
Kasser et al., 2014). 
So far, I have discussed the behavioural view of implicit attitudes, that is the 
BIRRs and EERRs and how the REC model offers an understanding of the implicit 
attitudes. I have also given a brief overview of how the IAT and IRAP works and a 
comparison of the two in which I argue why the IRAP has an advantage over the 
IAT. Lastly, I discussed how materialism has only been measured explicitly, and I 
will look into participant’s relational network towards materialism and anti-
materialism.  
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Experiment 1 
 Advertising appears to reinforce materialistic BIRRs (e.g., new car makes 
you happy, new iPhone = feeling powerful, feeling rich), and society then reinforces 
the EERRs of being materialistic (e.g., acquire wealth, boast about wealth). At the 
same time, there is the possibility of society reinforcing anti-materialistic EERRs. 
This could be from mingling with friends and family that are not so materialistic, 
and that verbal community might be reinforcing anti-materialistic EERR networks 
such as ‘You don’t need that new iPhone’, or ‘That car still works fine’. Overall, 
materialistic attitudes are related to anti-social behaviours that are self-serving which 
is detrimental to society. The strategies to counter materialistic attitudes as 
suggested by Kasser (2016) are to reduce exposure to materialistic values, increase 
pro-social behaviour, and make people feel more positive about themselves. In 
behavioural terms, these strategies involve reinforcing pro-social behaviours and 
BIRRs that are not materialistic (e.g., money is not everything, helping others is 
better than acquiring wealth). RFT defines relational responses that are established 
through previous history of reinforcement as an operant class and these responses 
have been reinforced across exemplars (Y. Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Bryan, 
& Smeets, 2001).  One of the possible ways to train BIRRs is to consistently 
reinforce relational responses through multiple exemplars, such as telling somebody 
that success is not measured by total wealth alone, but through other aspects such as 
relationships with family or friends, or the gaining of experience which money 
cannot buy, backpacking across the globe, volunteering every weekend. Those are a 
few examples where the relation of “success” and “happiness” is not linked to 
“money” or “wealth”. These relations could also be taught through a computer 
program, where a person is just reinforced for giving the correct answer that 
“happy” is “less stuff” or “budget brands”. Through consistently reinforcing the 
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behaviour of pairing “happy” with non-materialistic stimuli, materialistic BIRRs 
should decrease.  
My research goals were to use the IRAP to: (1) determine whether it is 
possible to train participants to override previous exposure to materialistic messages 
by training new BIRR links between material wealth and unhappiness, (2) 
investigate the cumulative effects of the materialistic training prior to the 
experiment, which comes from exposure to advertising and other possible 
materialistic messages it society and how training the new materialistic and anti-
materialistic BIRR links affect those materialistic attitudes, and (3) to see if an IRAP 
effect could be obtained from the set of stimuli used in the experiment.  
Participants were recruited and placed into one of three groups; Materialistic, 
Anti-Materialistic, or Control group. Training was done through a process called 
Multiple Exemplar Training (MET), which is simply reinforcement of bidirectional 
responding across multiple exemplars (Hayes et al., 2001). In the Materialistic and 
Anti-Materialistic group, the participants were given MET training for 10 min to 
train them in their respective BIRRs; Materialistic group for messages that 
materialism is good/anti-materialism is bad, and the Anti-Materialistic group for 
messages that materialism is bad/anti-materialism is good before taking the IRAP 
(see Table 1 in Methods). Participants in the control group received 10 min of 
playing the computerised card game, Solitaire, so that the participants were not 
trained or exposed to any materialistic or anti-materialistic BIRRs, but worked on a 
computer screen for the same length of time as the participants in the other two 
groups before taking the IRAP. After the IRAP, participants answered the MVS 
questionnaire as a measure of how materialistic they were: The higher the score on 
the MVS, the more materialistic they were deemed to be. 
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The six materialistic stimuli to be used in the IRAP and the MET training 
were derived from the MVS scale. Six anti-materialistic stimuli were the close-
approximate opposite of the six materialistic stimuli in terms of meaning. This 
method of using words that relate to the construct being measured, materialism, is 
based on the methodology of Hussey and Barnes-Holmes (2012), who derived the 
stimuli for measuring depressive emotional reactions by mapping the content of the 
depression scale from the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS) onto the 
IRAP.  
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Method 
Participants 
 I recruited 84 participants through the University of Waikato’s research 
participant database, word-of-mouth and recruitment posters put up throughout the 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Participants were offered the choice of either 
course credit (1%) towards their chosen undergraduate psychology course, or to 
enter a draw to win a department store gift voucher valued at 20 NZD. All the 
participants were students at the University of Waikato. No other demographic 
details were gathered.  
Apparatus 
 I administered the IRAP on a Dell OptiPlex 9010 (Intel i5-3570 3.2Ghz 
processor, 4GB RAM) running a 32-bit Windows 7 Enterprise Operating System 
(OS). A Dell P2210 22” LCD monitor positioned at eye level was used to present 
the stimuli. I used the 2012 IRAP Update II, written by Dr. Dermot Barnes-Holmes. 
Participants used a standard US keyboard to respond to the IRAP trials. Sessions 
were run in a small, quiet, lit, temperature-controlled room at the University of 
Waikato, with only myself and the participant present. I sat next to the participant 
during the training phase. During the testing phase, I sat behind and to the left of the 
participant. Table 1.1 shows the stimuli that were used for this IRAP. 
Table 1.1 
IRAP Stimuli 
Sample 1: Happy 
Response option 1: True 
Sample 2: Sad 
Response option 2: False 
Target words consistent with Sample 1: 
More things 
Luxury 
Expensive things 
Wealth 
Top brands 
Trendy 
Target words consistent with Sample 2: 
Fewer things 
Basic 
Cheap things 
Plain and simple 
Budget brands 
Second hand 
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Rob Bakker, a technician at the University of Waikato, wrote the program in 
Java code for the Multiple Exemplar Training (MET) trials. The program was a 
recreation of the consistent and inconsistent trials of the IRAP with some slight 
differences. The training trials are meant to train the participants in the materialistic 
group to be pro-materialism and the anti-materialistic group to be anti-materialistic 
in 10 min; therefore, feedback is provided at the end of each block (24 trials) so that 
participants are made aware of their responding and improve on it – to be faster and 
more accurate. The difference in the MET trials was that when the participant 
answered correctly, a green tick appeared with the words “Correct!” in the middle of 
the screen. If the participant answered incorrectly, a red cross with the words 
“Wrong! Try again” appeared in the middle of the screen.  
Solitaire (Cherry, 2009), a computerised version of the single-player card 
game, was used for participants in the Control group. Solitaire is available by default 
in Windows (Windows 7 Enterprise, 2009).  
I printed the Materials Value Scale (MVS) questionnaire on A4-sized paper 
to be administered to participants. The MVS questionnaire used in this experiment is 
the shortened 15-question version (Richins, 2004).  
Design 
 Participants in the Materialistic group were given 10 min of consistent-block 
training and participants in the Non-Materialistic group were given 10 min of 
inconsistent-block training (discussed below). Participants in the Control group were 
given 10 min to play Solitaire. Participants were assigned in a quasi-random manner. 
As participants signed up, they were assigned to either a Materialistic, Anti-
Materialistic or Control group in a rotation.  
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Procedure 
 I welcomed participants into the room, assigned them a participant number to 
preserve confidentiality and asked them to sit down in front of the computer. I then 
asked the participants to read through the Information Sheet (Appendix A). The 
information sheet explained briefly the reasoning behind the research project, the 
choice of course credit or entering a draw for store voucher, the experimental 
procedure and how participant data would be handled. I then answered any 
questions, and once participants were satisfied, I gave them a consent form 
(Appendix B) and a course credit form if that option was chosen. 
 I instructed participants in the Materialistic and Anti-Materialistic group that 
they were to be given 10 min of MET training and participants in the Control group 
were to be given 10 min to play Solitaire. I then told the participants that they would 
be given an IRAP after 10 min of training or Solitaire. 
 I instructed participants in the MET training group to “respond as if you are 
materialistic” or “respond as if you are not materialistic” for Materialistic and Anti-
Materialistic groups respectively. I explained to the participants that the task was to 
pair two words and respond to ‘True’ or ‘False’ based on their given MET rule and 
gave an example of words they would see before beginning the MET program. Each 
block was 24 trials and at the end of each block was a feedback screen. Participants 
were told to try and achieve above 80% correct and to do as many blocks as they can 
in 10 min.  I asked participants in the Control group if they knew how to play 
Solitaire. Participants who knew the rules were told to just play for the next 10 min, 
while participants who did not know or unsure of the rules of Solitaire were given a 
quick explanation of the rules and guided to play Solitaire for remainder of the 10 
min.  
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 There is a standard Version 1.4 IRAP Generic Experimenter’s Script that 
comes with the 2012 IRAP program. I modified the Version 1.4 IRAP 
experimenter’s script to fit in the new stimuli, and serve as a guide when instructing 
participants (Appendix C). I pointed out to the participants to read the rule at the 
beginning of each block, by restating the rule. For example, in the consistent block, 
the participants saw the words “Please answer AS IF consistent with materialism”; I 
told the participant if they saw that rule, “Please respond AS IF you are 
materialistic.” Participants were matched with their respective blocks (Materialistic 
and Control group did consistent blocks first, and the Anti-Materialistic group did 
inconsistent blocks first). This was to ensure that participants in the Materialistic and 
Control group were exposed to consistent blocks (be materialistic) first, and 
participants in the Anti-Materialistic group would be exposed to inconsistent block 
(be NOT materialistic) first, as to remove order effects, should there be any. Those 
from the MET training were told to respond as they were for the previous 10 min. 
Participants from the Control group were told to read the rule at the beginning of 
each block, “respond as if you are materialistic”, and then to answer ‘True’ or 
‘False’ to the word pair that appears later, based on the rule, along with an example 
of words they might see. Upon completion of the first two blocks (making 1 block-
pair), the IRAP presented a feedback screen that showed the accuracy and median 
response latencies for the two blocks.  
I then explained to the participants the required criteria of responding above 
80% correct and to respond faster than 2000ms in subsequent blocks. I mentioned 
that, should the participant respond slower than 2000ms in future blocks, a red 
exclamation mark would appear on screen but to not panic and instead focus on 
keeping the accuracy above 80% and to respond slightly faster than they currently 
were. Participants in the Materialistic and Control group were then shown that the 
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rule in the inconsistent block had changed and that they were to “respond as if you 
are not materialistic” and those from the Anti-Materialistic group were told to 
“respond as if you are materialistic”. I told the participants that they were tasked to 
try to achieve the practice criteria over 3 practice block pairs. If participants 
responded incorrectly over 3 consecutive trials or failed to achieve an accuracy of 
80% at the end of the block, I reminded them to slow down and focus on being 
accurate. If they did not achieve the criteria, I restarted the IRAP program and asked 
the participant to complete 6 testing blocks and to strive to achieve the set criteria.  
 Once the IRAP was completed, the participant was given an MVS 
questionnaire (Appendix D) and a black pen to fill it out. Upon completion of the 
MVS, I debriefed the participant and the experimental session ended. Each session 
lasted between 20-40 min. Figure 1.4 shows a schematic diagram of the 
experimental process. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4. A schematic diagram of the experimental progress. 
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Results 
Data Processing 
 The raw data from the Excel® files produced by the IRAP 2012 were time 
from the appearance of stimuli to first correct response (response latency) and 
whether the first response was correct or not (accuracy). I transformed the raw 
scores into D-IRAP scores in order to minimize impact from individual differences 
in motor skills and cognitive ability upon the latency data (Bast & Barnes-Holmes, 
2014; Greenwald et al., 2003). Table 1.2 shows the steps used to transform raw data 
into D-IRAP scores. The D-IRAP score is the difference of the response latencies 
between the consistent trial blocks and inconsistent trial blocks. 
Table 1.2 
D-IRAP Score Calculation Commonly Used In Recent IRAP Research 
Step Description 
1 Only data from the test block are used. 
2 Latencies over 10,000 ms are removed from the dataset. 
3 Participant’s data are removed if more than 10% of the latencies are less than 300 
ms.  
4 12 standard deviations are calculated. One from each of the four trial types; 
repeated across three test block-pairs. 
5 24 mean latencies are calculated. One from each trial type (4 trials x 6 blocks). 
6 12 mean differences are calculated. The mean latency of the consistent test block 
is subtracted from the mean latency of the inconsistent test block.  
7 12 D-IRAP scores are calculated. The 12 mean differences from Step 6 are 
divided by the corresponding standard deviation from Step 4 which results in one 
D-IRAP score for each of the four trial types for each test block. The end result is 
three D-IRAP scores per trial type.  
Shown mathematically, D = 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡−𝑀𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡+𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡
 .1 
8 Remove selected data from participants who failed to maintain the accuracy and 
latency criteria. Median latency and overall accuracy were calculated for each test 
block. If the median latency exceeded 2300 ms or accuracy was under 75% for 
either block in a block-pair, then that block-pair is removed. If more than one 
block-pair was removed, the participant’s dataset was excluded.1 
9 The D-IRAP score is calculated for each trial type, using the three D-IRAP scores 
for each trial type from Step 7 and dividing them by three. 
Mathematically, DFinal = 
𝐷𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟1+𝐷𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟2+𝐷𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟3
3
 .* 
Notes. 1 Exclusion criteria were chosen to reduce participant attrition rates as suggested in 
Hussey, Thompson, McEnteggart, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, (2015). 
* If test block-pair data were excluded in Step 8, the calculation would sum the D-IRAP 
scores and divide by two.  
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For the purpose of statistical analysis, I removed data where participants failed to 
maintain the criteria of ≥ 75% accuracy and a median response time of ≤ 2,300ms on 
at least two of the three test blocks-pairs as stated in Step 8 of Table 1.2 
Pass Rates 
 From the 84 total participants, 27 participants were assigned to the 
Materialistic group, 30 participants were assigned to the Anti-Materialistic group 
and 27 participants were assigned to the Control group. Three more participants 
were recruited into the Anti-Materialistic group to decrease the attrition rate. 
Eighteen participants failed to achieve the criteria and one participant was asked to 
leave the session due to health reasons. The data from a total of 65 (77.4%) 
participants were used for data analysis: 23 (85.2%) participants from the 
Materialistic group, 22 (73.3%) from the Anti-Materialistic, and 20 (74.1%) 
participants from the Control group.  
Split Half Reliability 
To assess the internal consistency of the IRAP, I totalled the four odd- and 
even- numbered trials and ran Pearson correlations which were corrected by using 
the Spearman-Brown formula. Internal consistency was low and nonsignificant, r = 
-.02, n = 65, p = .89. This means that the IRAP was not measuring ‘materialism’ and 
was probably measuring some other construct.  
Trial type analysis 
 One-sample t tests were calculated for overall mean D-IRAP score, which is 
the sum of each trial type across all three groups, the mean D-IRAP scores for the 
four trial types for each group, and the Total Score, which is the sum of the four trial 
types, to determine whether they were significantly different from zero. Cohen’s d 
effect sizes were calculated as well. Table 1.3 shows the mean D-IRAP scores, SEM, 
N, t, p and Cohen’s d values for the total and three groups. In the total calculation, 
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the mean D-IRAP scores for Trials 1 (M = 0.41, 95% CI = [.32, .50], t(64) = 9.11, p 
< .001) and Trial 2 (M = -.012, 95% CI = [-.02, -.22], t(64) = -2.48 , p = .02) were 
significantly different from zero showing that participants were quicker to respond 
in the consistent blocks. The effect size for Trials 1 (d = 2.29) and 2 (d = 0.62) were 
both large.  
Table 1.3 
Mean D-IRAP score, SEM, df, t, p, and Cohen’s d Scores for all Trial Types and 
Overall Mean across Three Different Groups.   
Group type Mean D-
IRAP 
SEM df t p Cohen’s 
d 
Overall 
Trial 1: Happy – Materialistic 
Trial 2: Sad – Materialistic 
Trial 3: Happy – Anti-Materialistic 
Trial 4: Sad – Anti-Materialistic 
Overall Total 
 
.41 
-.12 
.04 
-.04 
.29 
 
.05 
.05 
.05 
.05 
.10 
 
64 
64 
64 
64 
64 
 
9.11 
-2.48 
0.78 
0.84 
2.81 
 
.00 
.02 
.44 
.40 
.01 
 
2.29 
-0.62 
0.20 
0.21 
0.70 
Materialistic 
Trial 1: Happy – Materialistic 
Trial 2: Sad – Materialistic 
Trial 3: Happy – Anti-Materialistic 
Trial 4: Sad – Anti-Materialistic 
Materialistic Total 
 
.42 
-.03 
-.07 
.07 
.39 
 
.08 
.07 
.08 
.08 
.19 
 
22 
22 
22 
22 
22 
 
5.36 
-0.49 
-0.89 
0.88 
2.02 
 
.00 
.63 
.38 
.39 
.06 
 
2.29 
-0.21 
-0.38 
0.38 
0.86 
Anti-Materialistic 
Trial 1: Happy – Materialistic 
Trial 2: Sad – Materialistic 
Trial 3: Happy – Anti-Materialistic 
Trial 4: Sad – Anti-Materialistic 
Anti-materialistic Total 
 
.34 
-.15 
.10 
-.10 
.20 
 
.09 
.10 
.08 
.09 
.15 
 
21 
21 
21 
21 
21 
 
3.99 
-1.55 
1.24 
-1.10 
1.29 
 
.00 
.14 
.23 
.29 
.21 
 
1.74 
-0.68 
0.54 
-0.48 
0.56 
Control 
Trial 1: Happy – Materialistic 
Trial 2: Sad – Materialistic 
Trial 3: Happy – Anti-Materialistic 
Trial 4: Sad – Anti-Materialistic 
Control Total 
 
.48 
-.19 
.10 
-.12 
.27 
 
.07 
.08 
.11 
.10 
.19 
 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
 
6.93 
-2.24 
0.92 
-1.21 
1.42 
 
.00 
.04 
.37 
.24 
.17 
 
3.18 
-1.03 
0.42 
-0.55 
0.65 
 
However, once I broke it down to the individual groups, only the scores from 
Trial 1 for each of the all the three groups were significantly different from zero, 
showing that participants, for Trial 1, were quicker to respond in the consistent 
blocks than in the inconsistent blocks. For example, when the participants were 
shown “Happy” and “Luxury” they were quicker to press “True”, as opposed to 
when they were shown “Sad” and “Budget Brands”, they were slower to press 
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“False” Only for the control group was the score in Trial 2 significantly different 
from zero, and is a negative value, which means participants in the control group 
were faster in responding in the inconsistent blocks than in the consistent blocks. 
For the Materialistic group, only the mean D-IRAP score for Trial 1 (M = 
0.42, 95% CI = [.59, .26], t(22) = 5.36, p < .001) was significantly different from 
zero with a large effect size (d = 2.29). The mean D-IRAP scores for Trials 2, 3, and 
4 were not significantly different from zero (p > .05) with a small effect size in Trial 
2 (d = 0.21) and medium effect sizes for Trials 3 and 4 (d = 0.38). The means 
ranged from -0.12 to 0.41. Overall for the Materialistic group, the effect size was 
large (d = 0.86) while the mean D-IRAP score was not significantly different from 
zero (M = 0.39, 95% CI = [.80, -.01], t(22) = 2.02, p = .06). 
 I did not find a similar pattern in the Anti-Materialistic group except for the 
mean D-IRAP scores for Trial 1 (M = 0.34, 95% CI = [.52, .16], t(21) = 3.99, p 
< .001) with a large effect size (d = 1.74). The mean D-IRAP scores for the other 
trials were not significantly different from zero (p > .05). The means were smaller 
here, ranging from -0.15 to 0.34. Overall for the Anti-Materialistic group (M = 0.20, 
95% CI = [.51, -.12], t(21) = 1.29, p = .21), the results were not statistically 
significant, and the effect size was medium (d = 0.56).  
 In the Control group, I found that the D-IRAP score means ranged from -
0.19 to 0.48 and that only Trial 1 (M = 0.48, 95% CI = [.63, .34], t(19) = 6.93, p 
< .001) and Trial 2 (M = -0.19, 95% CI = [-.01, -.36], t(19) = -2.24, p = .04) were 
significantly different from zero. The effect sizes for Trial 1 (d = 1.74) and Trial 2 
(d = 1.03) were large, whereas Trial 3 and 4 had medium effect sizes (d < 0.5). 
Overall, the total mean D-IRAP score for the control group (M = 0.27, 95% CI = 
[.67, -.13], t(19) = 1.42, p = .17) was not significantly different from zero, but there 
was a large effect size (d = 0.65).  
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 Figure 1.5 shows the mean D-IRAP scores for the four trial types across the 
three different groups with 95% confidence interval error bars. A positive D-IRAP 
score represents a “more materialistic” attitude and a negative D-IRAP score 
represents “less materialistic” attitude. Each bar represents the overall score in each 
of trials, which is after the mean of the consistent block has been subtracted from the 
mean of the inconsistent block.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
 I also performed a three-way-mixed ANOVA, with the independent variables 
of “Group” as a between-subject variable, “Sample” and “Target” as within-subject 
Figure 2. Mean D-IRAP trial type scores across three different groups. Error bars show 
the standard error of the mean. Positive scores mean participants responded faster in 
the consistent blocks and negative scores mean participants responded faster in the 
inconsistent blocks. 
Figure 1.5. Mean D-IRAP trial type scores across three different groups. Error bars show 
the 95% confidence intervals. Positive scores mean participants responded faster in the 
consistent blocks and negative scores mean participants responded faster in the 
inconsistent blocks. 
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variables, with the D-IRAP score as the dependent. Group here was Materialistic, 
Anti-Materialistic and Control, Sample was “materialism” and “anti-materialism”, 
and target as “happy” and “sad”. 
 The assumptions of equality of covariance matrices were met, Box’s M = 
17.16, F(20, 13398) = .78, p = .74. There was no main effect of group, F(2, 62) 
= .31, p = .73, r = .1. This means that there was no difference in D-IRAP scores for 
students in the Materialistic, Anti-Materialistic and Control groups.  
 Table 1.4 shows the scores from the three-way mixed ANOVA for within-
subjects.  
Table 1.4 
Three-Way Mixed Analysis of Variance of Within-Subjects Effects 
Type Type III 
SS 
df Mean 
Square 
F p r 
Sample 1.42 1 1.42 9.48 .003 .36 
Target 6.39 1 6.39 51.67 .000 .67 
Sample * Group .11 2 .06 .38 .67 .11 
Target * Group .90 2 .45 .03 .03 .32 
Sample * Target 3.22 2 3.22 18.14 .00 .48 
Sample * Target * 
Group 
.27 2 .14 .76 .47 .15 
 
 There was a significant main effect of “sample”, F(1, 62) = 9.48, p = .003, r 
= .36. Table 1.5 shows the estimated marginal means for sample. The mean D-IRAP 
score for materialism (M = .15, 95% CI[.08, .21]) was significantly higher than for 
anti-materialism (M = -.002, 95% CI[-.08, .07]).  
Table 1.5 
Estimated Marginal Means Sample 
Type Mean 
Standard 
Error 
95% CI 
Upper Lower 
Materialism .15 .03 .08 .21 
Anti-Materialism -.002 .04 -.08 .07 
 
 There was a significant main effect of “target”, F(1, 62) = 51.67, p < .001, r 
= .67. Table 1.6 shows the estimated marginal means for target. The mean D-IRAP 
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score for “happy” (M = .23, 95% CI[.16, .29]) was significantly higher than for 
“sad” (M = -.09, 95% CI[-.16, -.02]). 
Table 1.6 
Estimated Marginal Means Target 
Type Mean Standard Error 
95% CI 
Upper Lower 
Happy .23 .03 .16 .29 
Sad -.09 .04 -.16 .02 
  
There were no significant interactions between sample and group or between target 
and group. However, there was a significant interaction between sample and target, 
F(1, 62) = 18.14, p < .001, r = .48. Figure 1.6 shows an interaction plot of the mean 
D-IRAP score plotted against the Sample for the Target. The interaction plot shows 
that there was a large discrepancy between materialistic and anti-materialistic D-
IRAP scores for “happy” but the D-IRAP score were similar for “sad” irrespective 
of materialism or anti-materialism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.7 shows descriptive statistics for the Total MVS scores. There was a 
trend in the mean Total MVS scores, where the Materialistic group produced the 
highest (M = 41.1), the Anti-Materialistic group lower (M = 39.9) and the Control 
group the lowest mean score (M = 36.8). 
Figure 1.6. Interaction plot of D-IRAP Scores plotted against the Sample – 
“Materialism” and “Anti-Materialism” for Target - “happy” and “sad”.   
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Table 1.7 
Mean Total MVS score, N, Standard Deviation, 95% Confidence Intervals for Each 
Group. 
Group type N Mean Sd 
95% CI 
Upper Lower 
Materialistic 23 41.1 7.29 44.28 37.98 
Anti-Materialistic 22 39.9 8.06 43.44 36.29 
Control 20 36.8 6.83 40.00 33.60 
 
 Table 1.8 shows the results of a one-way analysis of variance for the Total 
MVS score for each group. The results showed that there was no significant 
difference (p = .16) between the three different groups for the Total MVS scores. 
Table 1.8 
One-Way Analysis of Variance of Total MVS score. 
 SS df Mean 
Square 
F p 
Total MVS 
score 
Between Groups 208.74 2 104.37 1.89 .16 
Within Groups 3420.40 62 55.17   
Total 3629.14 64    
 
Regression 
 I performed two regression analyses to predict how the number of blocks 
completed in the Multiple Exemplar Training (MET) or accuracy in the MET would 
affect the total score in the Materials Value Scale (MVS) for the Materialistic and 
the Anti-Materialistic group as shown in Table 1.9. The factors used in the 
regression analysis were the number of MET blocks done and the overall MET 
mean percentage (total accuracy) against the total MVS score. The regression model 
for the Anti-Materialistic group was significant, F(2,19) = 3.833, p = .04, but the 
model for the Materialistic group was not significant, F(2,20) = .570, p = .58.   
For the Anti-Materialistic group, that the total number of MET blocks 
completed predicted the total MVS score, β = .56, t = 2.52, p = .02, in that the more 
trials completed, the higher the total MVS score predicted. On the other hand, the 
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total number of MET blocks completed in the Materialistic group, was not a 
significant predictor of the total MVS score, β = -.05, t = -.21, p = .31. 
Table 1.9 
Regression of Total Number of MET Blocks Done and MET Mean Percentage 
Correct against Total Materials Value Scale Score. 
MVS 
scale 
Group  B SE B  β t p 
Total 
MVS 
 
Materialistic  
 
Constant 41.47 27.08  1.53 .14 
MET Blocks 
Done 
-1.61 1.54 -.26 -1.05 .31 
MET 
Mean % 
Correct 
.11 .33 .08 .322 .75 
Total 
MVS 
 
Anti-
Materialistic  
 
Constant 24.08 20.17  1.20 .25 
MET Blocks 
Done 
4.05 1.60 .56 2.52 .02 
MET 
Mean % 
Correct 
-.05 .25 -.05 -.21 .83 
 
 In summary, only in Trial 1, Happy – Materialistic, were participants 
significantly faster to respond in the consistent block than in the inconsistent block. 
This means that the participants in all the groups were consistently materialistic and 
that the training had no effect. Results were mixed for the other trial types between 
groups. Finally, the regression analysis shows that the completion of more Anti-
Materialistic blocks is predictive of higher MVS scores.  
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Discussion 
 During my study, I examined: (1) whether it is possible to train participants 
to override previous exposure to materialistic messages by training new BIRR links 
between material wealth and unhappiness, (2) the cumulative effects of the 
materialistic training over time and how training new BIRR links affect them, and 
(3) if an IRAP effect could be obtained from the set of stimuli used in the 
experiment. The results showed that I was unable to train participants to override 
previous exposure to materialistic messages by training new BIRR links between 
material wealth and unhappiness in 10 min. In addition to that, from the regression 
analysis, it appears that the participants who did more Anti-Materialistic training 
blocks tended to have a higher total MVS score. There was no statistically 
significant result from decreasing Materialistic BIRR (Trial Type 1) across all 
groups, suggesting that there was no effect of decreasing Materialistic BIRR in the 
participants. I hypothesize that there was no effect due to the MET training being 
too short - 10 min was not sufficient to change Materialistic BIRRs that have been 
reinforced for extended periods. There is another possibility that the stimuli used in 
MET and IRAP did not reflect anti-materialism, which could explain the low split-
half reliability scores, as the IRAP was shown not to be measuring a single 
construct. Finally, I did find an IRAP effect from the set of stimuli used in the 
experiment, but only for Trial Type 1 (Happy-Materialistic) across all groups. Only 
in the Control group did I find an IRAP effect in Trial Type 2 (Sad-Materialistic).  
 Before beginning to discuss what the data mean, I will first explain what 
each trial type means. To make it easier to understand, I shall discuss the trial types 
as if they were a positive value (more materialistic). First, a recap in the rules given 
to the participants before beginning the IRAP, in the consistent block, participants 
were told “Respond AS IF you are materialistic.” In the inconsistent block, 
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participants were told “Respond AS IF you are not materialistic.” In the first trial 
type, Happy-Materialistic, when presented with ‘Happy’ and words like ‘Luxury’, 
participants were quicker to respond when instructed to press ‘True’ than when 
instructed to press ‘False’. In the second trial type, Happy-Anti-Materialistic, when 
presented with ‘Happy’ and words like ‘Basic’, participants were quicker to respond 
when instructed to press ‘False’ than when instructed to press ‘True’. The third trial 
type, Sad–Materialistic, when presented with ‘Sad’ and words like ‘Luxury’, 
participants were quicker to respond when instructed to press ‘False’ than when 
instructed to press ‘True’. Lastly, the fourth trial, Sad–Anti-Materialistic, when 
presented with ‘Sad’ with words like ‘Cheap Things’, participants were quicker to 
respond when instructed to press ‘True’ than when instructed to press ‘False’.   
Materialistic Group 
 The IRAP results from the Materialistic group showed that participants were 
significantly faster to respond in the consistent blocks than to respond on the 
inconsistent block for Happy-Materialistic trial. This is also true for the Sad-Anti-
Materialistic trial type, where participants were faster on the consistent blocks than 
the inconsistent blocks. Participants were faster to respond on the inconsistent 
blocks than on the consistent blocks for Happy-Anti-Materialistic, and Sad-
Materialistic trials. In summary, the D-IRAP scores show that participants’ BIRR 
tend to be materialistic, which means that they are quicker to answer ‘True’ when in 
the Happy-Materialistic, and Sad-Anti-Materialistic trials. In a broader aspect, this 
probably reflects the materialistic messages that have been reinforced by media and 
advertising over time; to be happy with materialistic values and sad with anti-
materialistic values.  
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Anti-Materialistic Group 
 The results from the Anti-Materialistic group shows that participants were 
also faster to respond in the consistent blocks than to respond on the inconsistent 
block for the Happy-Materialistic trial as well. Participants in this group were 
quicker, but not significantly quicker, than the participants from the Materialistic 
group when instructed to press ‘True’ in the Happy-Anti-Materialistic trial. On the 
Sad-Materialistic trial, participants in this group were quicker on the consistent 
blocks. Lastly, on the Sad-Anti-Materialistic trials, participants were quicker to 
respond on the inconsistent blocks. There was no effect on decreasing the 
materialistic BIRRs (Trial Type 1), therefore reflecting that the participants’ 
materialistic BIRRs were not affected enough for a change nor were the anti-
materialistic BIRRs strengthened enough by the MET training.  
Control Group 
 The results from the Control group shows that participants were the fastest to 
respond in the consistent block for the Happy-Materialistic trial. Participants here 
were also the fastest to respond in the inconsistent blocks for Happy-Anti-
Materialistic, and Sad-Anti-Materialistic trials. Just like the Anti-Materialistic 
group, participants here were significantly quicker in the consistent block for the 
Sad-Materialistic trials.  
 To put it simply, the results showed that in all the groups, the Happy-
Materialistic (Trial Type 1) trial was statistically significant from zero, showing an 
IRAP effect, but 10-min MET trials did not manage to change the BIRRs. These 
findings show that participants are still materialistic, which could translate to 
materialistic behaviours, such as higher compulsive purchasing behaviour (Dittmar, 
Bond, Hurst, & Kasser, 2014), increased shopping behaviours (Segev, Shoham, & 
Gavish, 2015), unlikeliness to volunteer (Briggs et al., 2007), and other anti-social 
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behaviours. On the other hand, in the Control group, the IRAP effect is also present 
in the Happy-Anti-Materialistic trials. What this means is that the participants are 
also quick to say ‘True” when presented with ‘Happy” when paired with words such 
as ‘Budget Brands’. To summarize, this means that the Control group participants 
are materialistic, but at the same time, they are also anti-materialistic. It would be a 
big leap to conclude that participants in the Control group can be predicted to 
engage in materialistic behaviours (i.e. anti-social behaviours) as well as opposites 
of anti-materialistic behaviours (i.e. pro-social behaviours). Instead, to look into the 
difference in scores as to why participants in the Control group can be pro-
materialistic as well as pro-anti-materialistic, a deeper analysis is required to find 
out what the participants think of the stimuli used in the experiment. This 
compatibility of stimuli was explored in Experiment 2. 
From a behavioural perspective, behaviour is related to the context, therefore 
what is seen as anti-social behaviour (i.e. not volunteering) would probably present 
itself when participants are asked if they would rather volunteer or go shopping on 
the weekend. In other words, participants cannot be generalized as anti-social 
individuals just because they have a high MVS score. During the IRAP’s 
inconsistent block, participants were given the rule to “respond AS IF you are not 
materialistic”, without any other following context. Each participant could have a 
different interpretation of “anti-materialistic” and therefore were not able to relate to 
the stimuli used in this experiment as per what I had in mind. This lack of context 
could lead to different interpretations of the materialistic and anti-materialistic 
stimuli which was explored in Experiment 2. In addition to that, there was an 
observable, but not statistically significant decrease in D-IRAP scores in the Happy-
Materialistic trials (Trial Type 1) in the Anti-Materialistic group. So perhaps the 
MET trials did affect the materialistic BIRR networks slightly. 
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ANOVA 
 In the three-way ANOVA, there was no main effect of group, therefore, 
there was no difference between D-IRAP scores across groups. The significant 
results are the main effect of “sample” – materialism vs anti-materialism, “target” – 
Happy vs Sad, and the interaction between sample and target. The interaction plot 
shows a large discrepancy between materialistic and anti-materialistic D-IRAP 
scores for “Happy” but not for “Sad”. This could mean that participants’ BIRRs are 
quicker to react when shown the stimuli “Happy” with either Materialistic or Anti-
Materialistic stimuli, but not so when shown with the stimuli “Sad”. In other words, 
participants find it easier to contact materialistic or anti-materialistic BIRRs when 
paired with the word “Happy” as opposed to “Sad”. The word “Sad” might not even 
have a strong enough relational network to elicit a response when paired with 
materialistic or anti-materialistic stimuli. This effect will be explored in Experiment 
2. 
Attrition Rate 
 The attrition rate in the Anti-Materialistic groups was the highest (26.7%), 
the Control group was the second highest (25.9%), and the Materialistic group was 
the lowest (14.8%). Participants from the Materialistic and the Anti-Materialistic 
groups had 10 min of exposure to IRAP trials, since the MET trials are just 
repetition of some IRAP trials. This pattern in attrition rate might be reflective of the 
stimuli used in the experiment. For instance, the Anti-Materialistic group had the 
highest attrition rate which is probably because the participants have not been 
trained to relate to the stimuli as “anti-materialistic”, there was no context given to 
the participants to frame those stimuli as “anti-materialistic”, and because the stimuli 
used is probably not reflective of anti-materialism. The Control group was the 
second highest attrition rate because they did not have prior exposure to IRAP trials 
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and therefore did not have more practice to achieve the responding criteria of 80% 
accuracy and 2000ms response speed on this difficult IRAP trial. The Materialistic 
group had the lowest attrition rate because participants can relate to the stimuli in a 
materialistic way, which would have been trained by advertising and society over 
time. One way to reduce attrition in IRAP studies is to use a ‘priming’ IRAP before 
taking another IRAP (Kishita, Muto, Ohtsuki, & Barnes-Holmes, 2014; Vahey, 
Boles, & Barnes-Holmes, 2010). To put it loosely, an ‘easy’ IRAP is given as a 
primer, to get participants familiar with IRAP, in order to decrease the attrition rate 
when participants are then given the more “difficult” IRAP. This sort of priming is 
said to increase the familiarity with the task and stimuli so that the participants can 
answer more difficult IRAPs, as they are quicker in switching between the 
consistent and inconsistent blocks (Kishita et al., 2014; O’Toole & Barnes-Holmes, 
2009; Vahey et al., 2010). This priming using “easy” IRAP before a “difficult” 
IRAP to lower attrition rate, however, was not fully present in my study as the Anti-
Materialistic group should have the primer in the form of 10 min of Anti-
Materialistic MET, but instead showed a higher attrition rate than then Control 
group which had no pre-IRAP training.  
Regression  
 The only significant result from the regression analysis was that participants 
who did more Anti-Materialistic MET trials were predicted to score higher on the 
MVS. In other words, the participants were predicted to be more materialistic, the 
more Anti-Materialistic MET trials they complete. This could probably be explained 
by the stimuli used in the Anti-Materialistic trials. Words such as “Fewer things”, 
“Basic”, “Cheap Things”, “Plain and Simple”, “Budget Brands”, “Second Hand”, 
might not necessarily reflect Anti-Materialistic values. I created the words used in 
the Anti-Materialistic trials by using words that closely approximated the opposites 
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of words used in the Materialistic trials, which were derived from the MVS. It could 
be that words that are opposite in meaning to materialistic words are actually words 
that still relate to materialistic relational networks. That is, it is possible that the anti-
materialistic words did not encapsulate the true meaning of anti-materialism for the 
participants. Adding to that, the lack of context of what “Respond AS IF you are 
anti-materialistic” could have led participants to access different anti-materialistic 
relational networks than those I had wanted them to access.  
Limitations, Future Research, and Conclusions 
The IRAP effect was observed only for the Happy-Materialistic trial across 
all three experimental groups, but it cannot be generalized as a predictor of 
materialistic behaviour as there was no data taken on materialistic behaviour. The 
results might not generalize to other populations as well because the participants in 
the experiment were only students. Students would be working part-time jobs at 
best, or having allowances from student loan or their parents, meaning to say their 
earning potential is a lot lower compared to working adults. The difference in 
earning power could account for the different interpretations of some of the anti-
materialistic stimuli (i.e. budget brands, cheap things, second hand) and was 
explored in Experiment 2. For example, for a banker who earns a lot more than a 
student, buying budget brand clothes might make him sad, and that could be 
reflected in the relational networks, a faster response speed when shown those 
stimuli. For a student who earns a lot less, budget brand clothes would not make the 
student sad, and that could have been reflected in the relational networks, with a 
slower response speed that is above the 2000 ms criteria.  Also, because of the 
method of using close approximates of the opposites of materialism, the stimuli used 
in Anti-Materialism trials may not be a clear reflection of Anti-Materialism. This 
interpretation is supported by the high attrition rates of the Anti-Materialistic group 
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and the regression analysis. To address the question of what words represent “Anti-
Materialism”, I ran focus group sessions with some of the participants in Experiment 
1 to gather their comments regarding the stimuli used in Experiment 1 and their 
suggestions for words that better represent “Anti-Materialism” in a student context. 
 In conclusion, in Experiment 1, I looked into the possibility of significantly 
decreasing materialistic BIRRs in a short amount of time, which I could not achieve, 
but a small change was still observed between experimental and control groups. The 
results also suggest that there is more than just “anti-materialism” that is being 
measured and that perhaps there is another underlying construct that needs to be 
teased out.  
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Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1 suggested that there might be more to the 
construct of “Materialism” and “Anti-Materialism” than just the 12 stimuli used, 
which were “more things, less things”, “luxury, basic”, “expensive things, cheap 
things”, “wealth, plain & simple”, “top brands, budget brands”, and “trendy, second 
hand”. The mixed results obtained from Experiment 1 suggested that perhaps the 
concept of materialism is not as clear-cut as simple words, and that the relational 
networks that affect the “value” that materialism or anti-materialism has is more 
complex than originally thought. Previous researchers have pointed out that 
materialism is a function of an individual’s own values (Kilbourne, Grünhagen, & 
Foley, 2005). In order to delve deeper into the relations that surround the construct 
of materialism and anti-materialism, I conducted a focus group to find out what the 
participants thought about the IRAP experiment and analysed the transcript using 
thematic analysis. The focus group was to find out what participants thought about 
Experiment 1 in terms whether or not materialism and anti-materialism was 
reflected in the stimuli used, and, if not, which words could potentially be reflective 
of materialism or anti-materialism.  
Thematic Analysis 
 Thematic analysis is a technique used in qualitative research to identify, 
analyse and report themes within a data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Guest, 
MacQueen, & Namey, 2012; Howitt & Cramer, 2014). There is no clear agreement 
on how thematic analysis is and how it should be done (Attride-Stirling, 2001); but 
it can be agreed upon that there are many commonalities across qualitative analytic 
methods, such as finding patterns, creating categories, data intimacy and the coding 
process (Saldaña, 2011). It should also be noted however that proper and systematic 
guidelines for conducting thematic analysis are not well-established and is an area 
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that requires development (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Guest et al., 
2012). Despite that, thematic analysis is widely used because it is regarded as the 
most useful, and easiest techniques to capture the complexities of meaning contained 
within textual data (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Guest et al., 2012).  
 As there are no systematic guidelines for thematic analysis, qualitative 
psychologists should be clear about the what they are doing and why (Attride-
Stirling, 2001). I used the 6-phase guide outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006), which 
is summarized in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1 
Phases of Thematic Analysis, from Braun and Clarke (2006) 
Phase Description 
1. Familiarizing yourself 
with the data 
Transcribing data, reading and re-reading the data, 
noting down initial ideas. 
2. Generating initial 
codes 
Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic 
fashion across the entire data set, collating data relevant 
to each code. 
3. Searching for themes Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data 
relevant to each potential theme. 
4. Reviewing themes Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded 
extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), 
generating a thematic map of the analysis. 
5. Defining and naming 
themes 
Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, 
and the overall story the analysis tells, generating clear 
definition and names of each theme. 
6. Producing the report The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, 
compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected 
extracts, relating back of the analysis to the research 
question and literature, producing a scholarly report of 
the analysis.  
 
Patterns in thematic analysis are classified and coded in two ways: first, an 
inductive coding approach where the collected data are not made to fit into existing 
coding framework and not directed towards the researcher’s theoretical framework, 
but instead the themes arise from the data by themselves (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
The second approach, theoretical or deductive analysis, is driven by the researcher’s 
theoretical framework and research question (Braun & Clarke, 2006). When 
conducting thematic analysis, if themes emerge from anywhere, they emerge from 
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the interchange between the researcher and the data (Willig, 2001). For my research, 
I conducted the thematic analysis using the second method, theoretical, as I bring to 
the research a theoretical or analytic interest. This form of thematic analysis tends to 
provide less detailed analysis of the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006) 
What is a Theme? 
 “A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the 
research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning 
within the data set” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 82). There is also no hard-and-fast 
method to decide what constitutes as a theme, therefore it is up to the researcher’s 
judgement to determine what constitutes as a theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The 
results from Experiment 1 showed that participants in the Control group were both 
materialistic and anti-materialistic in terms of their BIRRs. This was perhaps due to 
the stimuli used in Experiment 1 not being compatible, or reflective of the anti-
materialistic concept that I had in mind. The themes that may be generated from 
focus group discussion in Experiment 2 may shed some light on whether the stimuli 
used in Experiment 1 were reflective of materialism or anti-materialism, what 
replacement words could constitute as anti-materialism, and the thought process of 
the participants when they are asked to be materialistic or anti-materialistic.  
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Method 
Participants 
 I sent an email invitation to 63 participants who provided an email address in 
the Consent Form (Appendix B) from Experiment 1 because they wished to receive 
a copy of the findings of the experiment. Of the 63, eight of those email addresses 
failed to deliver. Twelve participants responded to the invitation, agreeing to meet 
for a focus-group discussion. Participants were offered 1% course credit which they 
could apply to one of several psychology courses to improve their final mark for 
their participation.  
Ethical consideration 
 My focus group research was approved by the School of Psychology Ethics 
Committee at the University of Waikato (#16:01). 
Procedure 
Two focus group sessions were held. Session 1 with 10 participants and 
Session 2 with two participants. I had given participants a choice of two time slots, 
1-2pm or 2-3pm due to room booking availability at the University of Waikato, and 
10 out of the 12 participants signed up for the 1-2pm time slot. With the remaining 
two participants, I had planned to cancel the 2-3pm session, but as the participants 
were very enthusiastic and eager, I ran Session 2 anyway. Participants responded by 
email to an agreed time, date and place for the focus group. At the scheduled times, 
the participants were invited to sit in a circle in one of the rooms, with a window, 
located at the University of Waikato, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. When all 
the participants had gathered, I introduced myself and explained the purpose of the 
focus group and told them that the session will be audio recorded. I provided the 
participants with copies of the consent forms (Appendix B), course credit forms, and 
a printout of Table 1.1 showing the stimuli used in Experiment 1.  
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A list of open-ended interview questions (Appendix E) was prepared as a 
prompt for the focus group discussion. The main questions asked were focused 
around what participants thought about the stimuli used in Experiment 1, whether or 
not they were reflective of materialism or anti-materialism, and what they thought 
about anti-materialism. Once the participants had filled out the forms, I began audio 
recording of the session. Each session lasted around 30-40 min. At the end of the 
session, I thanked the participants for their attendance and willingness to participant 
in the focus group. The recordings for both sessions were transcribed.   
Findings/Discussion 
 In Session 1, not all the participants were actively participating in the 
discussion, a majority of the discussion was centred on five of the participants and 
the rest were quiet. Session 2 was a more active discussion, which could be due to 
the small number of participants. The written transcripts from Session 1 was 4622 
words, and Session 2 was 3713 words. From those two transcripts, I extracted some 
common themes, grouped them and summarized them into a few themes: (a) “The 
stimuli used do reflect Materialism”, (b) “The stimuli used do not reflect Anti-
Materialism”, with two sub-themes of “replacement words that might reflect anti-
materialism”, “happy works but not sad for the stimuli used” and (c) “MET training 
is too short” with a sub-theme of “awareness”. I will describe these themes in more 
detail below. 
The stimuli used do reflect Materialism 
 This theme reflects that the participants who actively participated in the 
discussion agreed that the six stimuli used in Experiment 1 did reflect the values of 
Materialism. I asked if the six stimuli used in Experiment 1 was reflective of 
materialism, and while most of the participants agreed that it did, there was one 
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participant who pointed out that materialism has different values to it than just 
“obtaining branded stuff”. When asked to elaborate on it, that participant said: 
Sometimes I think that materialism is like, just the accumulation of stuff whether it 
is considered designer stuff or not, do you know what I mean? If I go and buy a 
whole lot of clothes but from a second hand store, but because I bought a whole lot 
of clothes I could still see that as being materialistic 
So essentially, the participants agreed that the stimuli used were reflective of 
“materialism”, despite the varying degree of value that they assigned to materialism. 
The general agreement was that materialism centres on obtaining material things, or 
more things.  
The stimuli used do not reflect Anti-Materialism 
 This theme is more complicated and was the major part of the focus group’s 
discussion. So far, previous research has examined how materialistic participants 
are, but with the basic assumption that people are essentially materialistic to varying 
degrees. There has been no research that looks into anti-materialism, which is 
probably the opposite end of the materialistic spectrum – rejecting material products. 
I asked if the stimuli used in Experiment 1 was reflective of the concept of anti-
materialism. As one participant has aptly pointed out:  
 I feel like these sorts of words are something that somebody who is 
materialistic would class. Like would class something as being basic or as 
being budget or plain and simple, but if you think that about something, and 
isn't that a materialistic mind-set or such? 
Which would probably be true, as the first-world populations live in a materialistic 
world, the method of creating the six anti-materialistic stimuli was merely a 
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brainstorm session of coming up with words that were approximately the opposite of 
the six materialistic stimuli. It is perhaps this method of close approximation of 
opposites that led to six anti-materialistic words that can still pass as materialistic. 
As previously pointed out by a participant, being able to buy multiple cheap clothes 
is still materialistic, as they are now able to buy more clothes than if it was an 
expensive brand. In this context, therefore, cheap and budget has a more 
materialistic connotation than I thought, as two participants did reflect this sentiment 
In addition, different participants have different thoughts about what 
constitutes as anti-materialism. For one of the participants, anti-materialism was 
about living within your means, the participant said, “Living within your means type 
of thing, not putting so much emphasis on material things. In this case, living within 
your means would still reflect materialism as it involves obtaining material wealth, 
but just enough to be within the participant’s earning power as well as to function 
well enough in today’s materialistic society. Another participant agreed and built 
upon that same idea, 
like realistically, you only need like one pair of jeans until that pair of jeans 
have worn out and then you'd need another pair of jeans sort of thing, so...I 
suppose anti-materialism would be having that one pair of jeans rather than 
having multiple styles of jeans even if they were multiple budget styles and 
are cheap, and uh basic, but you still got it. 
In the subject of living within one’s means, say you were to really only own one pair 
of jeans till the end of your life cycle. That could be seen as anti-materialistic, from 
a functional view, however, it could also be materialistic, as you would be buying 
that one pair of jeans. Essentially, that would probably be better classified as less 
materialistic rather than anti-materialistic. Going into finer details, for example, I 
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asked about the stimuli “budget brands” and how that is reflective of anti-
materialism, and most of the participants mentioned that it was not. Participant 1 
said “maybe instead of budget brands, you'd have uhm, grows own crops.” 
Participant 2 chimed in “Yeah, buying. That's one way of looking at it. Whereas 
uhm, growing your own veggies, that's anti-materialism”, with Participant 3 stating 
“But it's still stuff, just because something's cheap doesn't mean that you’re anti 
materialistic. Like going to K Mart and buying a whole lot of stuff”. 
Overall, this theme builds onto the next theme. As the participants mostly 
agreed that the stimuli used in the experiment were not reflective of anti-
materialism. One of the participants said “I think that these words are…less 
materialistic, than these ones but not necessarily not the opposite.” Participant 2 
mentioned:  
Like, there's anti-materialism of that, but then the way I was looking at, I 
was looking at it of as opposite to materialism, like kind of how you made 
them opposite, I was just thinking of opposite, not like actual anti-
materialism 
To which, Participant 2 agreed, “Yeah, that's what I was thinking of too”. Participant 
3 chimed in, stating “So, the words are like anti, but it's not really anti-materialism”. 
Participant 4 said “Because consumerism is everywhere, that it’s just ingrained, that 
it kind of becomes second nature for everybody” and Participant 5 was unsure about 
how the stimuli were reflective of anti-materialism:  
Uhm, I don't know, I feel like, yeah, most of them don't capture uh, but I think 
it's, I don't know like I was saying before, it comes down to people's 
definition of it, maybe they're just unsure of what it is. 
While the materialism stimuli were effective in contacting the materialistic 
networks, when it came to anti-materialism, the words, despite being close 
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approximations of opposite to materialism, were still not reflective of anti-
materialism. The following sub-theme will delve deeper into what anti-materialism 
is and which words could potentially reflect that concept.  
Replacement of words that might reflect anti-materialism 
I asked participants for suggestions of words that could replace the six 
stimuli used in Experiment 1, and which might reflect anti-materialism. Participant 1 
suggested, “Hand-me-downs. Hand-me-down clothing. It's anti-materialism. That’s 
reusing what is already there, instead of carrying on spending more money.” 
Participant 2 agreed with that statement, “Hand-me-downs...sounds more anti. Yeah, 
true. I love hand-me-downs”. 
Essentially, it is the value that participants place on objects which determines 
whether a word is reflective of materialism or not. Hand-me-downs were cited to 
reflect anti-materialism as it involved no monetary value, in the receiver of the items 
did not have to pay or exchange money for the item. Whereas, if it was second hand, 
as one participant said: 
Cause you’re still buying second hand, going into the shop and then still 
placing that materialistic value on the product instead of acquiring it free 
from an older brother or sister. 
So, when money is involved in an exchange that would be reflective of materialism. 
To truly be anti-materialistic, no money has to be involved in a trade. For example, 
in the first focus group, the participants suggested words that were more on action, 
and away from the focus of monetary value; one of the participants said “Maybe like 
action words, those words are kind of like nouns, but like how we do things, to do 
some sort of anti-materialistic attitudes. We can describe it using verbs, action 
words”. Another participant suggested “Could it be volunteer work. We are aiming 
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at careers as psychologists probably would value like quality strengths more than 
money, so that's the counted as anti-materialistic.” To which another participant 
chimed in, “the sense of achievement.” Compiling all those, I asked the participants 
if “giving it away, and donation, are those words more anti-materialistic?” 
Participants agreed, saying “Yeah. It does. Donation. Yeah”, “Yeah, charity work, 
giving time to charity, that's all anti-materialism.” And I asked if volunteerism could 
work as anti-materialism as well, which participants agreed that it did. 
Apart from action, using verbs, the context at which a situation occurs is 
relevant to whether the action is classed as materialistic or not. One of the 
participant suggested that materialism is linked with personal image, and how others 
perceive your actions: 
Yeah. And I think like, anti-materialism is kind of like, not, caring, what 
people think, sort of thing? Doing your own thing. Materialism is kinda like 
pleasing people. Like wanting people to think you’re cool. That's kinda 
what's in my head. 
Another participant said: 
I feel like, uhm, materialism, like, it feels to act materialistic it means you'd 
be so concerned with, it’s like an image. So I reckon sort of, say, you got 
people like Kanye West and such who wear all those flash clothes and flash 
and all that. You know, cool stuff. And then you think of that, anti-
materialistic kind of like no, you know,  
In light of that discussion, I raised the hypothetical question to participants in 
Session 1, if there was a hermit living in the wild, would that be anti-materialistic. 
One participant said “No.” Another participant argued “No. I don't think you can be 
52 
 
 
anti and have the experience of it, you know? You can't be a smoker if cigarettes 
don’t exist in your world.” It appears that the concept of materialistic and less 
materialistic is due to the existence of a consumerist culture. If that were to be 
absent, perhaps this view of “being materialistic” would not exist as well. The 
presence of a contrasting and strikingly opposite situation is what gives rise to the 
“anti-materialistic” mind-set. 
With the other focus group in Session 2, the participants were focussing on 
the functionality of the object in use. The function of the object is what determines if 
the situation can be classified as materialistic or less. Participant 1 said “Like I've 
got a bag and a pencil case, but really I only need a bag. I can just put my pens in 
my bag, rather than put them in a pencil case. Participant 2 gave a different example 
of functionalism, “Getting things that enhance your status. Like getting an upgrade 
of a car, because you want an upgrade of the car but you don’t actually need a new 
car because your old car is broken.” In terms of functionalism, Participant 2 
summarized it as “uhm, case-by-case study, like, depends what your using it for, like 
your using it for work or it actually has a strong function for you, and I don't think 
it’s out of necessity. Like I think you'd need that.” 
In summary, words that could potentially reflect anti-materialism are verbs, 
or action words, as the proverb goes, “Actions speak louder than words”. The act of 
giving up something could be viewed as anti-materialistic, be it a tangible material 
object, or something intangible like effort and time. On top of that, the context is 
important to note, such as the function of purchasing the object in the first place. If it 
was to impress others, or just to have minor improvements, that could be viewed as 
being materialistic. Additionally, the idea of using close approximates of the 
opposites towards materialistic stimuli is a reflection of the materialistic mind-set of 
the researchers as the words are suggested. To conclude, the lack of context 
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provided did not make it easier for the participants to see the anti-materialistic 
stimuli from the intended perspective – anti-materialism.  
Happy works but not sad for the stimuli used 
 The interaction plot from the results in Experiment 1 showed that there was a 
significant interaction between sample and target such that materialistic and anti-
materialistic D-IRAP scores for “happy” and “sad” differed but those for the word 
“sad” did not. I therefore asked participants on their thoughts about using “happy” 
and “sad” when paired with the stimuli used in Experiment 1. One participant 
responded, “I’ll be fine and happy with just non-materialistic things.” and another 
participant mentioned: 
Uhm, well, I think for me like, the words sad made it confusing, cause I think 
even not-materialistically I wouldn't be sad if I had wealth, I just wouldn't, 
like, define myself by that wealth or like, they wouldn't be happy but wouldn't 
be like, sad. 
Essentially, participants mention that they will not be sad if they did not have 
material objects or are able to fulfil their materialistic tendencies, but they won’t be 
happy either. To put it in another sense, participants are saying that if they are 
unable to be materialistic (e.g., purchase item of desire), they won’t be happy, but 
they won’t be sad either. It was an assumption that participants who cannot fulfil 
their materialistic needs will be sad. In a different example, if one was poor and 
hungry, finding and consuming food would satiate that hunger and that could lead to 
feeling “happy”, however, if one could not find food to consume, one would not 
necessarily be “sad”. There could be the possibility that the person would just accept 
that hunger and just carry on, neither happy nor sad about the feelings of hunger. 
Going back to materialism, being able to purchase items would indeed elicit 
“Happy”, and that could explain why participants are more readily to react when the 
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word “Happy” is paired with materialistic or anti-materialistic stimuli as opposed to 
the word “Sad”. 
MET training effects are too short 
 Participants agreed amongst themselves that the 10 min of training from 
MET, or lack of training for those in the Solitaire group, was not sufficient. I asked 
participants what they felt after 10 min of training, one participant identified 
themselves for doing 10 min of Solitaire instead, so that participant is from the 
Control group. These were the responses of participants from the Materialistic or 
Anti-Materialistic group: 
Participant 1: I only found that, when I walked away, I started, remembering 
that the sad side didn't make sense. 
Participant 2: The uh, consistent did make sense. I don’t whether that’s 
because, that’s, screamed at me through my television screen or radio all 
day and night. So you kind of clip on to those words and go…  
Participant 3: in 10 minutes, when you know, they got this whole perspective 
that they've been developing for 18-20 years. 
Materialistic messages have been reinforced through media for many years, and 
therefore 10 min of training was not sufficient to change those networks. It is also 
not sufficient to reinforce anti-materialistic networks, which was also compounded 
by the issue that the stimuli used were not reflective of anti-materialism.  
Awareness 
During the experimental debriefing sessions, participants have reported on a 
type of “awareness” when they were completing the MET and IRAP, especially in 
the inconsistent, or anti-materialistic portion of the experiment. Participants speak of 
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the “awareness” as them considering other meanings when doing the IRAP and 
when filling out the MVS. For example, when doing the inconsistent block (be anti-
materialistic), participants reported on thinking about materialism. This was again 
present when participants were filling out the MVS, they were considering other 
interpretations of the questions in the MVS, and whether they were or were not 
materialistic. In an attempt to get participants to discuss this “awareness” they 
reported, I first asked them if they thought the IRAP captured materialism and anti-
materialism, or just materialism alone. One of the participant responded, and another 
agreed, “Captures materialism really well.” Participants all agreed that “Like 
materialism is so obvious, stand out.” With that premise established, I asked if they 
felt it was the same for anti-materialism, and one participant responded, “I think it 
has the same effect, just like, you don't react the same way to materialism as you do 
anti-materialism.” Another participant clarified that “I think we're just more aware 
of materialism than we are anti-materialism.” To summarize this theme, I put out the 
statement “There's no words to really describe anti is there?” and a participant 
responded with, “No. there isn't.” 
From here, it was observed that the participants reported more strongly 
regarding this type of “awareness” when they were performing the anti-materialistic 
portion of the experiment. This awareness could have been present as well when 
they were filling out the MVS form at the end. To put it into the REC model’s 
perspective, this “awareness” that participants report on could be them contacting 
the EERRs. While the MET and the IRAP was training the BIRRs, the participants 
are still free to contact the EERRs a few seconds later as they reflect through the 
process of them performing the experiment. When it came to completing the MVS 
form, given that it is an external measure and no time-pressure was given, 
participants would be contacting their EERR networks as they complete the MVS 
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form. In other words, putting this into a different perspective, for example, say the 
participant was doing the consistent block of the IRAP, which requires immediate 
responding, would be training their materialistic BIRRs, and during the feedback 
screen, participants will have time to reflect and look back at the trials they just 
completed. This looking back, or reflecting upon what happen would be participants 
contacting their EERRs, which can either be the materialistic or anti-materialistic 
networks, or even both of them. At the end of the experiment, when the participants 
are filling out the MVS form, they will be accessing the EERR networks more often 
as they are not under pressure to respond quickly, along with the lack of context to 
what constitutes as “anti-materialism”, participants will be thinking a lot harder 
when they answer the questions in the MVS, whether or not they are materialistic 
and this accessing of EERR networks could be the “awareness” that participants 
reported on. 
Conclusion 
 In summary, participants agreed that the stimuli used in Experiment 1 were 
not fully reflective of Anti-Materialism, but agreed that they did reflect Materialism. 
Anti-materialism is not as clear cut as the “opposite of materialism”. The lack of 
context provided also compounded the participant’s interpretation of anti-
materialism and therefore was not directly training the anti-materialistic BIRRs that 
was intended to be the target. Care is required when discussing what constitutes 
anti-materialism as there are many more variables at play in the interpretation of 
anti-materialistic scenarios. The results also showed that 10 min is not sufficient to 
override decades of materialistic training, but it did manage to raise “awareness” 
towards materialism and anti-materialism. This, in turn, caused participants to re-
evaluate their EERRs regarding materialism as a whole and perhaps form new 
EERR networks about anti-materialism.   
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General Discussion 
One of the concerns was whether the MVS had been used in a New Zealand 
population and there have been two previous studies that used MVS in New Zealand 
(Smith Speck & Roy, 2008; Watson, 1998).  
Future studies could expand the population to include more participants from 
different walks of life, such as retirees, working-adults, teenagers, or younger 
children. Another possible future research would be to replicate this experiment with 
some changes, such as having participants fill out an MVS before and after the 
experimental procedure and compare the MVS scores to allow for a more precise 
measure of within-subject change in attitude. 
As I have mentioned before, the IRAP D-score may be a better predictor of 
behaviour than IAT scores, and so far three studies, to my knowledge, (Carpenter, 
Martinez, Vadhan, Barnes-Holmes, & Nunes, 2012; Leech, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Madden, 2016; Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012) have investigated this. Two 
materialism studies have looked at correlating materialism with behavioural 
outcomes, such as observing children becoming more selfish after watching TV 
advertising (Goldberg & Gorn, 1978), and a lower score in the Prisoner Dilemma 
Game (Sheldon et al., 2000). A suggestion for future studies would be to correlate 
these D-IRAP scores with observable materialistic behaviours, such as changes in 
purchasing behaviour, credit reports or volunteering. In addition to that, it would be 
interesting to see if extended periods of MET training could potentially change the 
BIRR networks, such as across weeks or months. Cassidy, Roche, and Hayes, 
(2011) has shown that BIRR networks can change significantly after extended 
period of training.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Participant Information Sheet 
Materialism and Implicit Attitudes 
Information Sheet 
My name is Stefan Lim and I am enrolled in the Masters of Applied Psychology 
(Applied Behaviour Analysis) course at the University of Waikato. It is my pleasure 
to invite you to participate in my experiment, designed to test the implicit attitudes 
around materialism using a computer-based assessment tool, the IRAP! 
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) is a computer-based 
assessment tool that has been used extensively to measure pre-existing implicit 
attitudes (understood in this context as being implicit relational responding) which 
have been acquired through historical learning processes. Watching advertising 
throughout your life would have created extensive and implicit relations regarding 
material objects and the goal of obtaining them or how you view them will reflect as 
how materialistic you are. This research study aims to see if those implicit attitudes 
can be temporarily changed with a simple 10-minute training. 
As an undergraduate, your participation may allow you to receive up to 1% of course 
credit (if available to you); those participants the experimental session and do not wish 
to receive course credit can opt to go into the draw to win one of three $20 Warehouse 
vouchers instead. 
As a participant you will be asked to: 
 Attend one experimental session that lasts between 40-60 minutes. 
 In the session, you will be tasked with a 10-minute training program. 
o After completion of the training program, you will be asked to undergo 
testing through the IRAP. 
o After the IRAP test, you will complete a Materials Value Scale (MVS) 
 
As a participant your data will remain anonymous: 
 After the experimental session any of the contact details used to schedule the 
time and date of your participation will be safely discarded along with your 
name and any other identifying information. 
 Upon arrival at the computer lab you will be given a participant identifier – 
this identifier will be attached to your data report with no other form of 
identification being used. 
 Consent forms and data sheets will be kept with the researcher for a period of 
one year after completion of the thesis – they will then be securely destroyed. 
 If you opted to receive a summary of research findings, your email address 
will be stored on a file separate from your results. 
As a participant your involvement is totally voluntary: 
 You may withdraw from this experiment at any time. 
 There is no academic requirement (or otherwise) for you to participate in this 
study. 
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If you have any questions regarding your involvement in this research please contact 
either the researcher, Stefan Lim, or his supervisor, Dr Timothy Edwards. 
Researcher Stefan Lim 
         School of Psychology, University of Waikato 
 Email: sxcl1@students.waikato.ac.nz 
 Mobile: 0210 260 7499 
Supervisor: Dr Timothy Edwards 
         School of Psychology, University of Waikato 
         edwards@waikato.ac.nz         
Co- Supervisor: Dr Rebecca Sargisson 
         School of Psychology, University of Waikato 
         rebeccas@waikato.ac.nz         
   
This research project has been approved by the School of Psychology Research and 
Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Waikato. 
Any questions about the ethical conduct of this research may be sent to the convenor 
of the Research and Ethics Committee (currently Dr James McEwan, phone 07 838 
4466 ext. 8295, email: jmcewan@waikato.ac.nz) 
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Appendix B: Consent Form 
CONSENT FORM (Appendix B) 
 
A completed copy of this form should be retained by both the researcher and the 
participant.  
 
Research Project:   Materialism and Implicit Attitudes 
 _________ 
 
Please complete the following checklist.  Tick () the appropriate box 
for each point.  
YES NO 
1. I have read the Participant Information Sheet (or it has been read to 
me) and I understand it.   
  
2. I have been given sufficient time to consider whether or not to 
participate in this study 
  
3. I am satisfied with the answers I have been given regarding the study 
and I have a copy of this consent form and information sheet 
  
4. I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary (my choice) and 
that I may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty 
  
5. I have the right to decline to participate in any part of the research 
activity 
  
6. I know who to contact if I have any questions about the study in 
general. 
  
7. I understand that my participation in this study is confidential and that 
no material, which could identify me personally, will be used in any 
reports on this study. 
  
8. I wish to receive a copy of the findings 
If yes, provide email address: 
____________________________________________ 
  
 
Declaration by participant: 
I agree to participate in this research project and I understand that I may withdraw at any time. 
If I have any concerns about this project, I may contact the convenor of the Psychology 
Research and Ethics Committee (Dr James McEwan, Tel: 07 838 4466 ext 8295, email: 
jmcewan@waikato.ac.nz)  
Participant’s name (Please print): 
Signature: Date: 
 
Declaration by member of research team: 
I have given a verbal explanation of the research project to the participant, and have 
answered the participant’s questions about it. I believe that the participant understands the 
study and has given informed consent to participate. 
Researcher’s name (Please print):  
Signature: Date: 
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Appendix C: Experimenter’s Script 
Experimenter’s Script 
Materialism and Implicit Attitudes 
For all participants (regardless of condition): When participant arrives, greet them, 
introduce myself and ask them what their name is. Check the timetable to determine 
the participant’s experimental condition and to confirm their details. Sit the 
participant in front of the desktop PC and give the participant their identity card and 
a consent form. Advise the participant that they are about to receive a consent form 
and an information sheet and there is no time limit to read and sign the consent form. 
If the participant is unwilling to sign the consent form, thank them for their attendance, 
remove all materials from the desk and show the participant the exit from the 
laboratory room. For participants who agree and want to continue with the 
experiment, load the training program relevant to the group (materialism/anti-
materialism training/solitaire). Present the participant with verbal instruction 
regarding the training program and they should summon the experimenter if they 
require further assistance.  
The written instructions for each condition are as follows 
Multiple Exemplar Training (MET) 
Materialism 
You are about to take a computer-based training task which involves a combination 
of two words that are presented simultaneously on the screen. Your task is to state 
whether the words are true or false according to the given rule. 
I’m going to train you how to do this task in stages, and when you’ve shown that 
you’ve learned how to do the task, I’ll leave you to practice it. 
In this study, we’re interested in materialism. So, what is going to happen is that, at 
the top of the screen, you will see “Happy” and in the middle of the screen you will 
see a word such as “trendy”, “wealth”, “basic” and so on. This is called a trial. 
You’ve got two response options at the bottom of the screen, one on the left and one 
on the right. Those response options are going to be “True” and “False”, but will 
switch sides randomly. Whatever is on the left of the screen will always be the “D” 
key and whatever is on the right of the screen is always the “K” key. 
You’ll be given a series of trials one after another in what we call a block. After 
each block, you’ll be given a break and some feedback on how you’re doing. 
What I’d like you to do is put a finger on the “D” key and a finger on the “K” key. 
The rule here is to response AS IF you are materialistic. This task is essentially a 
pairing task where you have to follow this rule. Although this might sometimes feel 
odd or may be something you disagree with, following the rule is how this training 
is conducted. Let’s do a few blocks for 10 minutes.  
First error: The task will give you a red X if you get an answer wrong and will not 
proceed until you choose the correct answer. The goal of this program is to train you 
to respond as accurately as you can AS IF you are materialistic.  
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After first block: You can see here at the end of a block of trials, the program gives 
you some feedback. Here is the graph that shows your accuracy and a time record of 
your average response speed across the block. I’d like to concentrate on your 
accuracy, the goal is to follow the rule accurately on every trial. 
After second block: Here you can see the graph changed and again the time trial is 
displayed. The goal here is to respond as accurately as possible. 
Anti-Materialism 
You are about to take a computer-based training task which involves a combination 
of two words that are presented simultaneously on the screen. Your task is to state 
whether the words are true or false according to the given rule. 
I’m going to train you how to do this task in stages, and when you’ve shown that 
you’ve learned how to do the task, I’ll leave you to practice it. 
In this training, we’re interested in anti-materialism. So, what is going to happen is 
that, at the top of the screen, you will see “Sad” and in the middle of the screen you 
will see a word such as “trendy”, “wealth”, “basic” and so on. This is called a trial. 
You’ve got two response options at the bottom of the screen, one on the left and one 
on the right. Those response options are going to be “True” and “False”, but will 
switch sides randomly. Whatever is on the left of the screen will always be the “D” 
key and whatever is on the right of the screen is always the “K” key. 
You’ll be given a series of trials one after another in what we call a block. After 
each block, you’ll be given a break and some feedback on how you’re doing. 
What I’d like you to do is put a finger on the “D” key and a finger on the “K” key. 
The rule here is to response AS IF you are anti-materialistic. This task is essentially 
a pairing task where you have to follow this rule. Although this might sometimes 
feel odd or may be something you disagree with, following the rule is how this 
training is conducted. Let’s do a few blocks for 10 minutes. 
First error: The task will give you a red X if you get an answer wrong and will not 
proceed until you choose the correct answer. The goal of this program is to train you 
to respond as accurately as you can AS IF you are anti-materialistic. 
After first block: You can see here at the end of a block of trials, the program gives 
you some feedback. Here is the graph that shows your accuracy and a time record of 
your average response speed across the block. I’d like to concentrate on your 
accuracy, the goal is to follow the rule accurately on every trial. 
After second block: Here you can see the graph changed and again the time trial is 
displayed. The goal here is to respond as accurately as possible. 
Control 
You are about to take a computer-based task which involves sorting cards into their 
respective piles in ascending order. This game is called Solitaire. If you are familiar 
with the task, you can proceed to play the game. 
If you are unfamiliar with the game, we can do a few trials together until you get the 
hang of it. Then you will proceed to play the game on your own. 
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IRAP 
From MET: Okay. Now you will take a computer-based task that is similar to what 
you have done previously. The rules are the same, respond as accurately and as 
quickly as you can. Let’s start with a few more training trials and I’ll explain the 
difference as we go through. 
Here we have is an inconsistent block. In this block of trials, you have to respond 
opposite to what you have learned. As a reminder, like the previous blocks, you 
have to respond as accurately as possible. 
Second pair of practice blocks: Here you have are a new pair of practice blocks. You 
now have an added element, to respond quickly. An exclamation mark will appear 
at the bottom of the screen if you take more than 2 seconds to respond on any trial. 
Remember though that accuracy should not be sacrificed for speed; you will find 
that you will naturally be quick when you are accurate and not the other way around. 
If you see a few consecutive red Xs, this means that you are going too fast. Slow 
down and get the rhythm of responding correctly. 
From Control: You are about to take a computer-based training task which involves 
a combination of two words that are presented simultaneously on the screen. Your 
task is to state whether the words are true or false according to the given rule. 
I’m going to train you how to do this task in stages, and when you’ve shown that 
you’ve learned how to do the task, I’ll leave you to complete it. 
In this study, we’re interested in materialism. So, what is going to happen is that, at 
the top of the screen, you will see “Happy” or “Sad” and in the middle of the screen 
you will see a word such as “trendy”, “wealth”, “basic” and so on. This is called a 
trial. 
You’ve got two response options at the bottom of the screen, one on the left and one 
on the right. Those response options are going to be “True” and “False”, but will 
switch sides randomly. Whatever is on the left of the screen will always be the “D” 
key and whatever is on the right of the screen is always the “K” key. 
You’ll be given a series of trials one after another in what we call a block. After 
each block, you’ll be given a break and some feedback on how you’re doing. 
What I’d like you to do is put a finger on the “D” key and a finger on the “K” key. 
The rule here is to response AS IF you are materialistic. This task is essentially a 
pairing task where you have to follow this rule. Although this might sometimes feel 
odd or may be something you disagree with, following the rule is how this training 
is conducted 
First error: The task will give you a red X if you get an answer wrong and will not 
proceed until you choose the correct answer. The goal of this program is to train you 
to respond as accurately as you can AS IF you are materialistic 
After first block: You can see here at the end of a block of trials, the program gives 
you some feedback on how you’re doing. I’d like to concentrate on your accuracy, 
the goal is to follow the rule accurately on every trial. 
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On this next block is an inconsistent block. In this block of trials, you have to 
respond opposite to what you have learned. So the rule now is to respond AS IF you 
are anti-materialistic. As a reminder, like the previous blocks, you have to respond 
as accurately as possible. 
Second pair of practice blocks: Here you have are a new pair of practice blocks. You 
now have an added element, to respond quickly. An exclamation mark will appear 
at the bottom of the screen if you take more than 2 seconds to respond on any trial. 
Remember though that accuracy should not be sacrificed for speed; you will find 
that you will naturally be quick when you are accurate and not the other way around. 
If you see a few consecutive red Xs, this means that you are going too fast. Slow 
down and get the rhythm of responding correctly. 
When participants meet the criteria 
Great! You’ve shown that you have learned how to do the task. I’ll let you complete 
this task now. The task itself is exactly the same as the practice was. The program 
will remind you what the new rule is before each block and you’ll do 6 blocks in 
total. You will need to respond with >80% accuracy and faster than 2000ms. You’ll 
still be given feedback after each block so that you can see how you’re doing. If you 
find your scores have dropped, you can take a break and try to get your accuracy up 
to >80% and speed up to <2000ms. 
NOTE: THINGS PARTICIPANT SHOULD NOT BE TOLD. 
In order to maintain task integrity, participants are not to be told which blocks they 
might find easier or more difficult. This means to not let them know which blocks 
are consistent and which are inconsistent with their biases.  
 Should a participant raise this issue, respond by telling them some 
participants do report that one or more blocks are easier/harder but 
the important thing is to go as accurately and as quickly as possible 
on all blocks. 
When participants do not meet the criteria 
Participants who do not meet the >80% accuracy and speed faster than 2000ms, the 
researcher will close the IRAP program and reopen it and allow the participant to 
jump directly into the 6 test blocks. When the participants are done with the task, 
they proceed to taking the MVS scale.  
MVS 
Great. Now that you’ve completed the IRAP, one final task for this session is to fill 
out this questionnaire. Here is a pen, and once you’ve completed it, summon me and 
you are free to go. 
Thank you for your time. 
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Appendix D: Materials Values Scale (MVS) 
 
 
MATERIAL VALUES SCALE (MVS) 
 
 
Citation:   
 
Marsha L. Richins (2004), The Material Values Scale: Measurement properties and 
development of a short form, Journal of Consumer Research, 31, 209-220. 
 
See also:  Marsha L. Richins and Scott Dawson (1992), "A Consumer 
Values Orientation for Materialism and Its Measurement:  Measure 
Development and Validation," Journal of Consumer Research, 19 
(December), 303-316. 
 
 
Scoring: 
 
Scoring values are: SA=5 
  A = 4 
  N = 3 
  D = 2 
  SD=1 
except for reverse scored items, which are items 3, 6, 7, 10, 14, and 15 
 
 
Subscales: 
 
Success – items 3, 5, 9, 12, 13 
Centrality – items 2, 4, 7, 10, 15 
Happiness – items 1, 6, 8, 11, 14 
 
For further information about subscales, short versions of the scale, and the psychometric 
properties of the MVS, see Richins (2004). 
 
 
Contact information: 
 
Marsha Richins 
Department of Marketing 
Cornell Hall 
University of Missouri 
Columbia, MO  65211 
 
richinsm@missouri.edu 
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ATTITUDE SCALE 
 
 
Indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements by 
circling the answer that best represents your feelings. 
 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 
Neutral 
 
Disagree 
Strongly  
Disagree 
SA A N D SD 
 
 
 
  1. I’d be happier if I could afford to buy more things. SA      A      N      D      SD 
  2. I like a lot of luxury in my life. SA      A      N      D      SD 
  3. 
I don't place much emphasis on the amount of material objects 
people own as a sign of success. 
SA      A      N      D      
SD 
  4. Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure. 
SA      A      N      D      
SD 
  5. The things I own say a lot about how well I'm doing in life. SA      A      N      D      SD 
  6. I have all the things I really need to enjoy life. 
SA      A      N      D      
SD 
  7. I put less emphasis on material things than most people I know. 
SA      A      N      D      
SD 
  8. My life would be better if I owned certain things I don't have. 
SA      A      N      D      
SD 
  9. I admire people who own expensive homes, cars, and clothes. 
SA      A      N      D      
SD 
10. The things I own aren’t all that important to me. 
SA      A      N      D      
SD 
11. 
It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can't afford to buy all  
the things I'd like. 
SA      A      N      D      
SD 
12. 
Some of the most important achievements in life include 
acquiring material possessions. 
SA      A      N      D      
SD 
13. I like to own things that impress people. 
SA      A      N      D      
SD 
14. I wouldn’t be any happier if I owned nicer things. 
SA      A      N      D      
SD 
15. I try to keep my life simple, as far as possessions are concerned. 
SA      A      N      D      
SD 
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Appendix E: Focus Group Prompts 
Focus Group Prompts 
Part 1: Show the participants the stimulus used in the IRAP 
1) What does materialism mean for you 
a. Do these stimuli encapsulate materialism for you? 
b. What comes to mind for you that reflects materialism? 
2) What does anti-materialism mean for you 
a. Do these stimuli encapsulate anti-materialism for you? 
b. How else might you think about anti-materialism? 
3) What are your thoughts for the stimulus during the consistent blocks 
4) What are your thoughts for the stimulus during the inconsistent blocks 
5) Do you have any insights, or comments, to make about your experience of 
completing the IRAP on materialism? Is there anything that stood out as 
being particularly difficult? Easy? What was the easiest thing? The hardest 
thing? 
 
Part 2: Reveal that the data shows MET training predicts opposite effects (ie: Mat 
MET = anti-materialism and Not MET = materialism). 
1) What are your thoughts regarding the data? 
2) Do you think that the IRAP captures materialism/anti-materialism? 
Elaborate. 
